Domestic Abuse Did Not Amount To Coercion Defense

The Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld an alcohol-related driving offense and rejected the defendant’s coercion claim grounded in her well-established fear of life-threatening domestic abuse

REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.

Joan Stetzer was physically, emotionally and sexually abused by her husband for many years. During one particularly violent attack, Stetzer fled in her vehicle despite having consumed alcohol. She headed for safety at the couple’s lake house 15 minutes away. Before she reached the lake house, however, Stetzer was stopped by police and arrested. She was ultimately charged with operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) as a second offense in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(b) (2017–18).

At trial, Stetzer stipulated that her blood alcohol concentration was above the legal limit, but argued that she was acting under circumstances of coercion, a complete defense under WIS. STAT. §§ 939.45(1) and 939.46(1). That defense would allow Stetzer to operate a motor vehicle with a PAC if a threat by another person caused her reasonably to believe that doing so was the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm. Stetzer argued that her husband’s violent attack was indeed such a threat, and that she reasonably believed that driving to the lake house was the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm.

After a bench trial, the circuit court concluded that the elements of the coercion defense were met when Stetzer initially decided to drive away from her home, agreeing with Stetzer that “definitely she had to get out of there” and that “there was a fear of great bodily harm or death.” But the circuit court nevertheless held that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that, by the time she was pulled over, Stetzer was no longer acting lawfully under the coercion defense based on a “timing issue.” Surmising that “there has to be an end point to the defense,” the circuit court found that, at some point before she was pulled over, Stetzer knew there were means of safety available other than continuing to drive. For this reason, the circuit court concluded that the elements of the defense were no longer met, and thus found Stetzer guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a PAC.

The circuit court and court of appeals had affirmed the conviction

It emphasized the circuit court’s factual finding that, at least when Stetzer passed the police car, she knew there were means of safety available other than going to the lake house. Id., ¶19. The court of appeals reasoned that even “[a]ccepting (as the trial court did) that driving was the correct answer to the ‘classic dilemma’ that Stetzer’s expert said she faced,” “evidence in the [r]ecord does not show that Stetzer continued to hold a reasonable belief that, once she was out of her husband’s immediate vicinity,” driving was the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm. Id., ¶23 (emphasis in original).

Conviction affirmed

The long-standing abuse that Stetzer endured at the hands of Behlmer and the events of May 23 and 24, 2017, are tragic. It is undisputed that Stetzer faced an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm that night, and that she reasonably believed that driving away from the house was the only means of preventing that threat. But it is only what happened after that point that is before us.

The circuit court concluded that, at some point before Stetzer was pulled over, she could no longer reasonably believe that continuing to operate a motor vehicle with a PAC was the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm. In reaching that conclusion, the circuit court applied the correct legal standards. Specifically, the circuit court correctly required that all elements of the coercion defense be met for the entire duration of Stetzer’s ongoing, otherwise-criminal act and  considered Stetzer’s personal history when evaluating the reasonableness of her belief that continuing to operate a motor vehicle with a PAC was the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm. Additionally, a reasonable factfinder could conclude, as the circuit court did, that Stetzer’s belief became unreasonable before she was pulled over. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision.

JILL J. KAROFSKY, C.J., dissenting.

“I’m going to take you out, you fucking bitch!” Threats, violence, abuse, manipulation, and coercion were all tactics Bill Behlmer employed to exert power and control over his wife, Dr. Joan Stetzer.  In the early hours of May 24, 2017, Behlmer yelled the above threat as Stetzer cowered in her truck, wearing only pajamas. She was trying to escape Behlmer’s rage after he engaged in several acts of domestic abuse, including throwing Stetzer down a flight of stairs. Behlmer also threatened Stetzer by calling 911 and promising, “They [the police] [a]re going to get you just like the last time.”

At 2:00 a.m., Stetzer fled in her vehicle without her phone, a change of clothes, a wallet, shoes, or even a plan. Just as Behlmer predicted, she was pulled over by the police a few miles from her house. Stetzer, not Behlmer, was arrested. She was later charged with disorderly conduct as an act of domestic violence; operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content; and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.

At trial Stetzer asserted the defense of coercion, see WIS. STAT. § 939.46(1) (2017–18), which allows a person to engage in unlawful conduct if the actor reasonably believes that the conduct is the only means of protection from a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm. Once Stetzer put forth sufficient evidence to assert the defense of coercion, the burden shifted to the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was not being coerced.

Coercion

To summarize, the majority misses the mark by adopting the circuit court’s incorrect conclusion that the State met its burden. The State’s entire case, and the circuit court’s conclusion, depended on two facts: the presence of an officer and Stetzer’s familiarity with the area. Yet a diligent examination of the record—including those two facts—reveals that the State failed to disprove Stetzer’s coercion defense. The circuit court did not apply the correct legal principles in evaluating the State’s case. Undoubtedly, Behlmer’s history of abuse, and his manipulation of law enforcement, coupled with his threat to use the police to “get” Stetzer, would cause a reasonable person in Stetzer’s circumstances to believe that seeking help from the police could catapult Stetzer back to Behlmer’s violence and abuse. And being in a familiar place would be cold comfort to anyone in Stetzer’s circumstances, given that the place was just as familiar to Behlmer, and he had followed her in the past. It was reasonable for Stetzer to believe that Behlmer’s escalating physical abuse remained dangerously impending. At minimum, a reasonable doubt remained as to whether the State showed that Behlmer was no longer coercing Stetzer. The majority adopts the circuit court’s legal error, effectively eliminating the coercion defense for a victim it was written to protect.

The dissent concludes

Focusing on the abuser rather than the victim may have saved Stetzer from having to flee in her truck, at 2:00 AM, all alone, in bare feet, praying for protection. “[W]omen face a legal twilight zone: laws meant to protect them and deter further abuse often fail to achieve their purpose, because women . . . are simply not believed.”

We must do better. All victims should be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect. They should be protected and feel safe. Indeed our society should be judged by how we treat our most vulnerable. I respectfully dissent.

(Mike Frisch)