A Matter Of Degree

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part the dismissal of claims brought in connection with a revoked degree

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Boise State University revoked Chelsey “Brooke” Dudley’s bachelor’s degree in social work after the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW), which hosted Dudley for an internship, informed the university that Dudley used a state database to view a third party’s confidential information without permission. Dudley sued the university, several students, several administrators and employees, and an IDHW employee (hereinafter, “BSU”), for violating her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. Dudley sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and money damages.

The district court dismissed Dudley’s suit for failure to state a claim. As to Dudley’s procedural due process claim, the district court concluded that she lacked a property interest in her degree, and that—even if she possessed such an interest—BSU gave her adequate process. With respect to Dudley’s substantive due process claim, the district court concluded that Dudley failed to plausibly allege that she was unable to pursue a career in social work.

We reverse in part and affirm in part. We hold that Dudley’s BSU-issued college degree is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that BSU failed to afford Dudley adequate process before depriving her of that interest. However, because it was not clearly established that Dudley had a property interest in her college degree or any entitlement to certain procedural protections, we hold that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dudley’s substantive due process claim seeking monetary damages. Finally, we dismiss Dudley’s appeal of the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.

The degree was awarded in May 2022 but thereafter

On November 2, 2022, Defendant Tony Roark, BSU’s Interim Dean for the College of Health Sciences and Social Work, sent Dudley a letter notifying her that BSU had received information from IDHW “establishing beyond doubt that [she] accessed confidential client information within IDHW’s database, information in files [she] had no authorization to view and in which [she] had no legitimate business interest.” Specifically, Dudley is alleged to have accessed the records of the father of her child and the records of the biological mother of his other child. Roark also advised Dudley that BSU would retroactively change her passing grade for SOCWRK 481 to a failing grade. And because Dudley failed SOCWRK 481, she did not meet the requirements for graduation, rendering her transcript “invalid.” Roark told her that she could appeal the decision to change her grade. He also told her that the matter had been referred to the Office of the Dean of Students for additional discipline. The next day, Mandy Nelson, BSU’s Registrar, sent Dudley a letter stating her “degree has been rescinded.” Nelson informed Dudley that her diploma was “no longer valid and should be destroyed.”

She sought a hearing 

Dudley complained of the time constraints placed upon her at the hearing and the fact that she was not permitted to cross-examine any witness who provided a written statement.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Complainant asked the Board to revoke Dudley’s degree and expel her from BSU. Dudley alleges that [Assistant Dean of Students] Law remained with the Board while they deliberated.

Law subsequently notified Dudley that the Student Board of Conduct decided to revoke her degree and expel her because it determined that it was “more likely than not” that she violated the ethical and professional standards and expectations established in BSU’s Professional Conduct and Professional Standards, IDHW’s expectations for employees and interns, and “state/federal privacy laws.” Law stated that the “start date” for both sanctions was March 15, 2023. Dudley unsuccessfully appealed the Board’s decision.

The district court dismissed the ensuing lawsuit; the court here concluded

BSU conferred a diploma to Dudley in a public ceremony. The diploma itself is physical property, suitable for framing. And BSU has effectively demanded it back. The diploma was important enough that, when BSU first decided that Dudley had violated various terms of her internship, university rules, and national ethical rules for social workers, it advised her that “the diploma you received for your BA is no longer valid and should be destroyed.” While Dudley’s diploma, like the title to a car, has relatively little intrinsic value, it has substantial extrinsic value as near conclusive evidence of a bundle of legal rights. The diploma’s real value is not in its sheepskin, but in what it represents: the rights and responsibilities pertaining to a Bachelor of Arts degree from BSU.

In sum, Dudley’s diploma, and the degree it represents, have real value. Therefore, we hold that Dudley’s degree is a property interest that BSU may not rescind without due process.

The search for truth

We hold that Dudley has a due process right to ask questions to adverse witnesses affiliated with BSU—and, in particular, Law. Law does not have first-hand knowledge of Dudley’s conduct; that witness would be Dixon, who declined to testify in person but submitted a sworn statement. Yet Law’s investigation is the foundation for BSU’s complaint, and Dudley should be able to question her about the people she spoke with, the evidence she gathered, and her diligence in establishing the facts. Without the ability to question Law, Dudley can only proffer her own account of the events; that testimony is critical to her defense, of course, but an opportunity to testify in her own defense is not the same as being able to probe the strength of the university’s case against her.

BSU and Dudley have a shared interest in reaching the truth. BSU does not further its institutional interests by erroneously revoking a diploma. We can see little burden to BSU to make Law available for questioning since she was already present at Dudley’s hearing. It is surely not a severe “fiscal and administrative burden[]” that BSU has a strong interest in avoiding. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Although Law’s primary task was investigating Dudley, Law allegedly created an evidentiary “hearing packet” that “included documents that [Law] had drafted” herself. Law thus plausibly acted as a witness, in addition to a prosecutor (and, possibly, an adjudicator) in Dudley’s case. Because Law was intimately involved in Dudley’s case, we conclude that making her available for questioning would substantially reduce the likelihood of “erroneous deprivation.” See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.

Holding

We conclude that BSU’s first revocation of Dudley’s degree without any notice or hearing deprived her of due process. And, on balance, we further conclude that BSU’s alleged artificial restrictions on Dudley’s time for presenting her case and its alleged refusal to allow her to examine BSU-affiliated witnesses also deprived her of due process. Both of these decisions go to the heart of the Student Conduct Board’s truth-finding function and, thus, given the important interests at stake here, we conclude that those procedures created an unacceptable risk of an erroneous result.

By contrast, we conclude that Dudley failed to plausibly allege that BSU violated due process by giving her insufficient notice prior to her conduct hearing, or by allegedly allowing Law to remain in the room with the Board when it deliberated its decision. We offer no views on the merits of BSU’s dispute with Dudley and hold only thatDudley properly pleaded that certain elements of BSU’s process were inadequate. Insofar as the district court dismissed Dudley’s claim stemming from BSU’s alleged failure to provide Dudley with sufficient time to present her case or directly or indirectly cross-examine witnesses, we reverse the district court.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Dudley’s procedural due process claim insofar as Dudley alleged that Defendants denied her due process by not allowing her sufficient time to present her defense and by refusing to allow her to cross-examine or otherwise question adverse BSU-affiliated witnesses at her conduct hearing, and we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Dudley’s substantive due process claim. We AFFIRM the district court’s judgment granting qualified immunity to the Defendants as to Dudley’s claims for monetary relief. Finally, we DISMISS Dudley’s appeal of the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.

(Mike Frisch)