Dismissal Reversed; Discovery Allowed

A dismissed complaint has been reinstated by the New York Appellate Division for the Fourth Judicial Department

In May 2022, an 18-year-old man (shooter) committed a racially motivated mass shooting at a grocery store in Buffalo, resulting in the death of 10 people and injuries to many others. Plaintiffs commenced this action against, among other parties, defendant RMA Armament, Inc., doing business as RMA (RMA), which sold to the shooter body armor that he wore during the attack, and Blake Waldrop and Cory Clark (individual defendants). According to the complaint, Waldrop, during the relevant time period, was the chief executive officer and majority owner of RMA, and Clark was a social media spokesperson and customer service representative for RMA. Clark allegedly communicated directly with the shooter to effectuate the sale of body armor.

The complaint alleges that the RMA body armor protected the shooter from a security guard’s gunfire, thereby allowing the shooter to kill the security guard and shoot more people inside and outside of the store. Plaintiffs seek to hold the individual defendants personally liable for their respective roles in providing the body armor to the shooter, asserting jurisdiction over the individual defendants under CPLR 302 (a) (1) and (3).

The individual defendants moved to dismiss the complaint against them for lack of personal jurisdiction (see CPLR 3211 [a] [8]). Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiffs failed to “satisfy the elements for long arm jurisdiction” over either of the individual defendants. Although the court added that it fully expected that both individual defendants would likely “be deposed during the course of discovery regarding RMA’s liability,” it denied plaintiffs’ alternative request for permission to engage in jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs now appeal from an order granting the motion, and we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to jurisdictional discovery before it can be determined whether dismissal is warranted (see Williams v Beemiller, Inc., 100 AD3d 143, 152 [4th Dept 2012], amended on rearg 103 AD3d 1191 [4th Dept 2013]).

Dismissal not warranted

The issue here concerns the court’s jurisdiction over one of RMA’s principals and one of its employees, regardless of the court’s jurisdiction over RMA. With respect to Waldrop, plaintiffs allege that he was intimately involved in the daily operations of RMA, was involved in developing the body armor used by the shooter, and was directly involved in the marketing and sales of that body armor. They also allege that he chose to allow the sale of body armor to civilians, i.e., non-military and non-law enforcement personnel, or was “deliberately indifferent” to such sales, and that he knew RMA body armor was being marketed to and sold in New York. We conclude that those allegations are sufficient to warrant discovery on the matter of personal jurisdiction vis-à-vis Waldrop (see Williams, 100 AD3d at 153-154; cf. Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch, 149 AD3d 485, 487 [1st Dept 2017]; see generally Penguin Group [USA] Inc. v American Buddha, 16 NY3d 295, 302 [2011]).

With respect to Clark, plaintiffs allege that he, personally, marketed the body armor to, and communicated directly with, the shooter, encouraging him to purchase the body armor, either knowing or having reason to know that the shooter was a civilian. Plaintiffs further allege that, as a result of that individual conduct, Clark knew that RMA’s body armor was being sold to civilians in New York, presenting grave risks to New York residents. We thus likewise conclude that plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to warrant discovery on the matter of personal jurisdiction vis-à-vis Clark (see Williams, 100 AD3d at 153-154; cf. Coast to Coast Energy, Inc., 149 AD3d at 487; see generally Penguin Group [USA] Inc., 16 NY3d at 302).

Inasmuch as we conclude that plaintiffs “are entitled to conduct discovery on essential facts pertaining to jurisdiction” (Sovik v Healing Network, 244 AD2d 985, 987 [4th Dept 1997], amended on rearg 679 NYS2d 858 [4th Dept 1998]), we reverse the order, deny the individual defendants’ motion and reinstate the complaint against them.