New Trial For Murdaugh Banker
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has vacated a conviction for bank and wire fraud and ordered a new trial of an associate of the notorious Alex Murdaugh due to the issues relating to the removal of a juror
The Government alleged in the indictment and sought to prove at trial that, between 2006 and 2021, Laffitte used his position as Chief Executive Officer at Palmetto State Bank (the “Bank”) to assist Alex Murdaugh, a disbarred South Carolina attorney, in defrauding Murdaugh’s clients.
Laffitte and Murdaugh were alleged to conspire to defraud Murdaugh’s personal injury clients and to obtain money and property by materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises by making misleading statements and omissions.
In furtherance of the conspiracy, Murdaugh requested that Laffitte serve as the conservator or personal representative for the settlement accounts of multiple clients from Murdaugh’s firm. As a result, Laffitte could access the settlement accounts and used those accounts to collect over $450,000 in fees and to extend sixteen unsecured loans worth approximately $960,000 to Murdaugh. In total, Laffitte and Murdaugh were alleged to have stolen nearly two million dollars from the settlement accounts.
In September 2021, Murdaugh’s law firm discovered that he had been stealing from both the firm and his clients. The firm subsequently fired Murdaugh, reported his thefts to the authorities, and notified Laffitte that Murdaugh was no longer with the firm.
After learning about Laffitte’s involvement in Murdaugh’s theft of settlement funds, the Board of Directors at the Bank voted to sever the Bank’s relationship with Laffitte.
Jury notes received during deliberations
After closing arguments and the court’s instructions to the jury, the jurors began deliberating at 10:22 a.m. on November 22, 2022. Around 7:45 p.m., the court summoned the parties and counsel to the courtroom to disclose the receipt of two notes from Juror No. 93. The first note stated: “Need antibiotic @ 19:20[.] I can delay 1-2 hrs,” and was signed “# 93.” S.J.A. 3305.4 The second note read: “Feeling pressured to change my vote,” and was signed “# 93.” S.J.A. 3306.
Later
The final note came from Juror No. 88, and it stated: “Your Honor, Can you please call a[n] alternative [sic] as I am experiencing anxiety and unable to clearly make my decision.” S.J.A. 3308. Under her signature as Juror No. 88, she wrote that she could “provide more information as needed if necessary!” Id.
The court conducted an in camera interview with juror #88 and “dismissed [her] sua sponte from the jury without notice to, or an opportunity to hear argument from, the parties”
While the court rejected a number of claims, it held that the removal of juror #88 violated the defendant’s rights
In applying these principles to Juror No. 88’s removal, we find that there is a reasonable and substantial possibility that her request for removal stemmed from her views of the case. In so finding, the chronology of Juror No. 88’s responses during the in camera interview is crucial. First, the district court asked if Juror No. 88 wanted to “share anything,” and reminded her not to divulge information about the deliberations. S.J.A. 3310. In response, she stated: “I was very proud to do this. At one point, I thought I wouldn’t be able to. But I am prescribed medication and I’ve been taking notes clearly. I have my decisions that I made. But I started to feel very anxious due to some of the reactions to my decision.” S.J.A. 3310 (emphasis added). The district court then asked Juror No. 88 whether she felt like she could perform her duties or if she wanted to be replaced with an alternate. She responded: “Your Honor, I don’t want to be replaced, but—and I’m usually very strong when someone is butting up, but I don’t want to be trialed [sic] for my decision.” S.J.A. 3310 (emphasis added). Not only did Juror No. 88 indicate that she did not want to be replaced, but she reiterated her immediately prior statement that her request for removal was causally linked to her decision, that is, to her view of the case. At that point, under Brown, the district court had a variety of choices to adequately protect Laffitte’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury: send the juror back to deliberations with instructions that the jury continue to attempt to reach agreement, recess for the evening, or declare a mistrial. See 823 F.2d at 596. The district court did none of them.
Error not harmless
Here, the Government has not carried its heavy burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Sixth Amendment violation was harmless. By Juror No. 88’s own admission, she was experiencing anxiety due to the other jurors’ reactions to her views of the case, suggesting disagreement within the deliberation room. Indeed, before Juror No. 88 was removed, the jury deliberated for nearly eight hours. Following her removal, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts in under an hour. On this record, we do not find that the Government has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the removal of Juror No. 88 was harmless.
Presence
we hold that the removal of Juror No. 88 also violated Laffitte’s Fifth Amendment right to be present and that such violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Mike Frisch)