Smartmatic v. Powell
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Carl Nichols) will permit Smartmatic leave to amend its complaint against Sidney Powell to establish jurisdiction with respect to allegedly defamatory statements made outside the District of Columbia
To be sure, Powell’s declaration concedes that she was in the District for the December 10 interview. Powell Decl. ¶ 20. And her reply brief concedes that she was in the District for the November 19 press conference as well. Powell Reply at 2 n.2, ECF No. 34. Thus, for the reasons given in Powell I, Smartmatic has sufficiently pleaded personal jurisdiction for claims related to Powell’s statements at the November 19 press conference and during the December 10 interview.
That the Court has personal jurisdiction over Powell for claims relating to those statements does not, however, mean that it has personal jurisdiction for claims relating to her other statements. After all, “each separate defamatory statement itself constitutes a separate and distinct cause of action.” Katz v. Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., 332 F. Supp. 2d 909, 917 (E.D. Va. 2004) (quotations omitted). And because specific personal jurisdiction is claim-specific, it “must be established for each claim.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274–75 (5th Cir. 2006); see also 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1351 (3d ed. 2023) (“There is no such thing as supplemental specific personal jurisdiction; if separate claims are pled, specific personal jurisdiction must independently exist for each claim and the existence of personal jurisdiction for one claim will not provide the basis for another claim.”). Accordingly, for its claims based on statements Powell made on November 14, 15, and 16, and during the interview on November 19, Smartmatic must establish claim-specific forum contacts. In the face of Powell’s unrebutted declaration, Smartmatic’s reliance on its Complaint’s bare allegations about Powell’s location does not suffice.
For now, however, the Court will not dismiss these claims. Smartmatic has requested leave to either amend its Complaint or take jurisdictional discovery. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 11 n.4, ECF No. 27. The standard for granting leave to amend a complaint is generous: “The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Likewise, the “standard for permitting jurisdictional discovery is quite liberal,” and leave may be granted even when the plaintiff “has not made out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” Diamond Chem. Co., Inc. v. Atofina Chems., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2003).
The Court finds no basis for denying Smartmatic leave to amend its Complaint. See Zalduondo v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 146, 160 (D.D.C. 2012) (observing that grounds for denial include undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice, and futility). And given Powell’s activities and whereabouts during the relevant period, see generally Powell Decl., Powell I, 554 F. Supp. 3d 42, the Court finds that Smartmatic’s request for discovery is made with a “good faith belief that such discovery will enable it to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant,” Diamond Chem., 268 F. Supp. 2d at 15 (quotations omitted). At the very least, the Court does not believe that discovery here “would amount to nothing more than a fishing expedition.” Bastin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 104 F.3d 1392, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Accordingly, Smartmatic shall file, within two weeks of this Opinion and Order, notice of whether it intends to amend its Complaint or take jurisdictional discovery on the question of Powell’s contacts with the District with respect to her allegedly defamatory statements. The case is stayed pending the filing of an amended complaint or the completion of jurisdictional discovery.
(Mike Frisch)