District Of Columbia May Sue For January 6 Damages

The District of Columbia has properly pleaded a damages claim but not one for injunctive relief against the Proud Boys and other defendants according to a decision of Judge Mehta of the federal district court

This case, like others before the court, seeks to hold civilly liable certain individuals who participated in the riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. This case differs from the others, however, in that the plaintiff here is not a police officer or Member of Congress claiming individual harm, but rather the District of Columbia. The District demands compensation for, among other things, the costs it has incurred, and continues to incur, to provide medical care to Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers who responded to the Capitol on January 6th. Am. Compl., ECF No. 94, ¶ 458. It seeks to hold responsible 37 individuals and two entities (Proud Boys International, LLC and Oath Keepers).

Key holding

It is important to frame what the complaint in this case actually pleads. Notwithstanding some imprecise language in its opposition, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 52 (arguing that the “District also sufficiently alleged civil conspiracy claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress”), the District does not allege three separate conspiracies whose objects were to assault MPD officers, batter them, and to cause them emotional distress. Rather, the complaint alleges an overarching agreement to take part in the unlawful acts of “obstructing federal officials in the performance of their constitutional duties,” “inciting and carrying out a riot,” “unlawfully trespassing on federal property,” and “committing numerous acts of intimidation, threats of violence, and violence.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 478, 483, 488. The alleged acts of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are tortious overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 479, 484, 489. So understood, the complaint makes out a plausible claim of civil conspiracy much like the trespass example cited in Halberstam, albeit on a far larger scale.

The court need not recite the alleged facts chapter and verse. It suffices to say that the complaint alleges that Defendants, individually and collectively, came to the Capitol on January 6th to obstruct Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote. Some Defendants are alleged to have breached the security perimeter of the Capitol grounds; others are alleged to have forcibly entered the building intending to stop the vote. Some Defendants are alleged to have brought arms to the outskirts of the District of Columbia to support a possible incursion into the Capitol; some are alleged to have had direct violent confrontations with members of the MPD who were at the Capitol that day. To corroborate these allegations, the court can, and does, take judicial notice that some Defendants have been convicted—either by plea or by jury verdict—of participating in a criminal conspiracy to obstruct Congress, other conspiratorial conduct, or related criminal conduct. See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that, when reviewing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts may take judicial notice of facts on the public record). The District’s overall claim of civil conspiracy, and the moving Defendants’ involvement in it, is therefore plausible. The alleged acts of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against MPD officers were “reasonably foreseeable” consequences of the scheme, for which Defendants can be held liable, even if they themselves did not carry out those tortious acts. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487

(Mike Frisch)