The Law Of Lustful Disposition

The Washington State Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded a criminal conviction in a case involving allegations of sexual abuse of a child

In this case, we are asked to examine the “lustful disposition” doctrine. We are also asked to evaluate whether a prosecutor’s statements in closing, asking the jury to decide if the witnesses were telling the truth, constitute misconduct that—absent an objection—was so prejudicial that reversal is warranted. We conclude that the term “lustful disposition” is archaic and reinforces outdated rape myths and misconceptions of sexual violence. Moreover, use of that term wrongly suggests that evidence of collateral offenses relating to a specific victim may be admitted for the purpose of showing that the defendant has a propensity for committing sexual misconduct. Therefore, we now reject the “lustful disposition” label and hold that “lustful disposition” is not a distinct or proper purpose for admitting evidence. To the extent our precedent indicates otherwise, it is disavowed. However, rejection of the label “lustful disposition” does not modify our established doctrine of allowing “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to be admitted as “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident” pursuant to ER 404(b). In this case, we conclude that evidence of Crossguns’s uncharged acts of sexual assault was properly admitted for permissible ER 404(b) purposes. Therefore, the trial court’s reference to lustful disposition in its decision admitting the evidence was harmless. Further, we conclude that the prosecutor’s statements constitute misconduct, but the prejudice could have been corrected by an instruction. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals in part and reverse in part, and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The term is a mislabel for admissible evidence under Rule 404

This demonstrates that “lustful disposition,” properly understood, is not a distinct purpose for admitting evidence, but a label used to refer to permissible ER 404(b) purposes in the specific context of sex crimes. This anachronistic label is incorrect and harmful. It is often incorrectly used to admit evidence of behavior that is prominent in crimes of sexual abuse, such as grooming, victim identification, and planning, which has nothing to do with general sexual attraction. Moreover, the term “lustful disposition” reinforces the myth of the pathological, crazed rapist who is a stranger to the victim. By continuing to label this kind of evidence as proof of a “lustful disposition,” we perpetuate other rape myths that improperly focus on the victim. This reinforces incorrect and harmful misconceptions about sexual assault. We therefore conclude the term “lustful disposition” is both incorrect and harmful. We reject the “lustful disposition” label, and to the extent that our precedent indicates that “lustful disposition” is a distinct, permissible purpose for admitting evidence, we clarify that it is not.

The prosecutor had argued that it was the jury’s task to decide who told the truth

The prosecutor’s statements mispresented the jury’s role, which is to determine whether the State has proved the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

The prosecutor’s reference to “eye contact” was a slur on the defendant’s Blackfeet Nation heritage

While Crossguns does not challenge these statements by the prosecutor in closing argument, we note that it is inappropriate for counsel to utilize any appeal to racist stereotypes to bolster their arguments.

The Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction on prosecutorial misconduct grounds.

Justice McCloud dissented

The jury heard extensive, highly prejudicial evidence of uncharged acts of sexual misconduct extremely similar to the acts comprising the charged crimes. The trial court admitted that evidence for several purposes, including that it was relevant to proving the defendant’s “lustful disposition” toward R.G.M.

I agree with the majority that we should abandon the “lustful disposition” doctrine as incorrect and harmful. But I disagree with its holding that any error in admitting the challenged evidence to show “lustful disposition” was harmless because the evidence was admissible for a different ER 404(b) purpose. Actually, the evidence admitted under the lustful disposition moniker was classic propensity evidence—and ER 404(b) bars admission of such propensity evidence under any name…

But the majority does not abandon the [lustful disposition] doctrine at all. The majority just changes its name. That solves nothing. I therefore disagree with the remainder of the majority’s reasoning and conclusions on the admissibility of the challenged evidence for another purpose.

(Mike Frisch)