True Threats And Intent To Cause Terror
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a conviction for violation of the State’s threats of violence statute applied to “true threats” on these facts
In January 2017, [defendant] Mrozinski slid an envelope under the door of the Initial Intervention Unit of St. Louis County Children’s Protection Services. She had handwritten “MISS ME YET?” on the outside of the envelope, which contained a letter and four toe tags, like ones used to identify bodies in a morgue. The letter read:
JUST A LITTLE NOTE FOR ALL MY FRIENDS @ CPS . . .
DID YOU REALLY THINK YOUR LAME-ASS THREATS TO CONTINUE YOUR ILLEGAL COURTHOUSE BULLSHIT WOULD SCARE ME, YOU FUCKING CUNTS?!
MY CHILDREN WILL BE 16 SOMEDAY, AND YOU WON’T BE ABLE TO DO SHIT ABOUT IT.
CHILDHOOD IS NOT FOREVER.
DEATH, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS.SLEEP TIGHT, BITCHES!
(PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY . . . SLEEP WITH ONE EYE OPEN?)
Each of the four toe tags contained the handwritten name of a different person associated with Mrozinski’s child protection matter that resulted in Mrozinski losing custody of her children. In the space on the tags labeled “case number” were handwritten numbers starting with “#1 of 9” going up to “#4 of 9.” Each toe tag also included a handwritten address for “place of death,” a date for “date of birth,” “TBD” for “date of death,” and insulting names in the other spaces. Some of the birthdays and addresses were accurate, but some were not. All four people named on the toe tags reported making changes to their daily routines and taking safety precautions accordingly. Three of the persons named said that they believed that Mrozinski was capable of carrying out her threats.
After an analysis of First Amendment precedent
Given the statutory safeguards listed above that narrow the Statute’s reach—that the threat be considered in context, that it refer to a violent crime, that the defendant be conscious of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing extreme fear and disregard the risk—few situations of reckless but protected threats would be swept up in criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, the Statute is not facially overbroad.
Justice Thissen dissented and would require proof of “a specific intent to cause terror”
“True threats” is a category of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment. But the boundaries of the category are ill-defined. In this case, our fundamental task is to define the contours of the true threats category. Specifically, we must determine whether the unprotected true threats category includes threatening speech or expressive conduct where the speaker does not intend to cause extreme fear in the person to whom a threat is directed. I conclude that the answer to that question is “No.” Accordingly, I dissent. Appellant Chris Mrozinski’s conviction for violating Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2020), for making threats in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror, but without any determination that she acted with a specific intent to cause terror, must be reversed.
(Mike Frisch)