Crime And Punishment In Indiana

The Indiana Supreme Court addressed thorny criminal law issues in two cases decided yesterday.

Double jeopardy in the Wadle case

we expressly overrule the Richardson constitutional tests in resolving claims of substantive double jeopardy. Going forward, and with a focus on statutory interpretation, we adopt an analytical framework that applies the statutory rules of double jeopardy. See infra Section I.B.3. This framework, which applies when a defendant’s single act or transaction implicates multiple criminal statutes (rather than a single statute), consists of a two-part inquiry: First, a court must determine, under our included offense statutes, whether one charged offense encompasses another charged offense. Second, a court must look at the underlying facts—as alleged in the information and as adduced at trial—to determine whether the charged offenses are the “same.” If the facts show two separate and distinct crimes, there’s no violation of substantive double jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition, “included” in the other. But if the facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other, then the presumption is that the legislation intends for alternative (rather than cumulative) sanctions. The State can rebut this presumption only by showing that the statute—either in express terms or by unmistakable implication—clearly permits multiple punishment.

The defendant here stands convicted of several offenses for leaving the scene of an accident after twice striking and seriously injuring his victim while driving drunk. Because we interpret the statutory offenses charged as alternative sanctions, we hold that the defendant’s multiple convictions violate the statutory rules of substantive double jeopardy. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate all but one of his convictions: Level 3 felony leaving the scene of an accident. And because this conviction alone justifies the penalty imposed, we further instruct the trial court to leave in place his sixteen-year sentence with two years suspended to probation.

Multiple offenses in the Powell case

Most everyone would agree that intentionally shooting at and killing two persons (one immediately after the other) amounts to two separate murders. Reasonable persons would also likely conclude that robbing a person and then brutally beating and injuring that person (all in the same encounter) amount to two separate criminal acts: robbery and aggravated battery. Other scenarios, however, are less clear. Is the baker who sells four loaves of bread on Sunday subject to four counts of violating the “blue law” or only one? Does the theft of a single package in which several articles of property belong to multiple persons amount to one offense or multiple offenses? Does every punch thrown upon a single victim amount to a separate act of battery? Are two pulls of the trigger one attempted murder or two? Does it matter if the defendant aimed at two victims rather than one? What if he had aimed at the same person but on different days and at different locations?

Here

The defendant here, during an escalating confrontation, fired five to six shots in rapid succession at two victims sitting in an adjacent vehicle, seriously injuring one of them. In these circumstances, may a court convict on one count of attempted murder (for the single act of shooting) or two (one for each victim)? While our attempted-murder statute contains no clear unit of prosecution, we find sufficient evidence of the defendant’s dual purpose in firing his weapon: intent to kill both victims. Accordingly, we hold that the defendant’s actions, despite their proximity in space and time, amount to two distinct, chargeable offenses.

(Mike Frisch)