The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department has imposed reciprocal discipline for a sanction imposed in Tennessee

Misconduct

Respondent who represented the landlord, obtained a default judgment totaling $130,091.62 in favor of his client, in January of 2019 and received levied funds from two banks. In February of 2019, the first bank remitted $60,453.81 into the court which respondent retrieved from the clerk’s office. In March of 2019, the second bank levied $130,091.62 in funds directly to respondent which he deposited into his escrow account. In total respondent collected approximately $190,545.43, which was $60,453.81 more than the judgment. In April of 2019, respondent remitted $117,703.22 to his client representing the amount of the judgment less $13,000 in fees and costs, and filed a Satisfaction of Judgment with the court. Respondent failed to obtain an order from the court authorizing the release and disbursement of the levied funds. As of April 19, 2019 the balance of respondent’s attorney trust account was $60,405.81 representing the excess levied funds he received. After consulting with an attorney he had worked with on other cases, respondent chose to retain the excess levied funds. Respondent then consulted his client and returned the $13,000 representing his fees and expenses in exchange for an agreement to bring a second action against the same tenant with the excess levied funds used to satisfy his fees and expenses for both actions. Respondent commenced a second action on July 5, 2019, but it was voluntarily dismissed six days later.

On March 10, 2020 respondent was ordered to pay to the court in Tennessee $130,091.62 by March 13, 2020. After an unsuccessful appeal of that order, respondent paid to the court $60,405.81 on December 22, 2020. At a contempt hearing held on February 22, 2021 respondent testified that the $60,405.81 was borrowed from his father and he did not remit the entire $130,091.62 as directed by the court order because those funds had already been disbursed to his client. The court issued two orders one on July 17, 2021 and the other on February 15, 2022, finding that respondent’s non-compliance with the March 10, 2020 order, and his conflicting testimony at the contempt hearing as to whether he maintained the funds in his escrow account and would pay the money to the court, were sufficient to hold respondent in both criminal and civil contempt. Respondent appealed and the appellate court in Tennessee dismissed the contempt proceedings with prejudice giving as reasons the lack of opposition by the tenant’s successor in interest (a bankruptcy trustee) and that the district attorney declined to prosecute any charges.

Reciprocal sanction

This Court does not have a policy of staying suspensions to impose a probationary period nor do the Rules for Attorney Discipline provide for stayed probationary suspensions (see Matter of Kort, 235 AD3d 35, 39 [1st Dept 2025]). Misconduct comparable to that of respondent typically results in a one-year suspension (see Matter of Feldman, 230 AD3d 13, 17 [1st Dept 2014]; Matter of Salo, 77 AD3d 30, 38-39 [1st Dept 2010]; Matter of Byler, 274 AD2d 275, 279 [1st Dept 2000]).

As for the respondent’s request that the one year suspension be effective nunc pro tunc to the date of his suspension in Tennessee on January 18, 2024, there is no evidence that there is good cause to grant this relief. Respondent notified the AGC of his suspension on February 12, 2024, fairly close to the time he was suspended. He was reinstated on a probationary basis to the Tennessee Bar on May 14, 2024. Here, the AGC did not substantially delay in seeking reciprocal discipline, nor did respondent voluntarily cease practicing law in New York in anticipation of future discipline so that prospective suspension would be inequitable, unjust, and nunc pro tunc relief warranted (see Matter of Peters, 127 AD3d 103, 109 [1st Dept 2015]; Matter of Filosa, 112 AD3d 162, 164 [1st Dept 2013]; Matter of Gilly, 110 AD3d 164 [1st Dept, 2013]).

Accordingly, the AGC’s motion should be granted and respondent suspended from the practice of law in the State of New York for a period of one year, effective 30 days from the date of this order, and until further order of this Court.