Compelled By Prevailing Law

The failure to present a legally untenable defense does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, according to a decision today of the New Jersey Appellate Court

We begin with defendant’s claim that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to present an insanity or psychiatric defense in connection with the DWI charge. His argument is premised on the assertion that these conditions, particularly when manifested independently of alcohol consumption, would have undermined the State’s ability to prove impairment under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.

To assess this claim, we apply the familiar two-prong test established under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 53-58 (1987). A defendant must demonstrate both: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694; State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 359 (2009).

Here, the first prong is dispositive. Trial counsel’s decision not to advance an insanity defense was not only reasonable but compelled by prevailing law. DWI under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 is a strict-liability offense to which affirmative defenses based on mental states, including insanity, diminished capacity, or intoxication, do not apply. See State v. Hammond, 118 N.J. 306, 307, 310 (1990); Federico, 414 N.J. Super. at 326.

The most thorough treatment of the purported defense raised here appears in an opinion, State v. Inglis, 304 N.J. Super. 207 (Law Div. 1997), authored by then Law Division Judge Jose Fuentes, P.J.A.D. (Ret.). There, the court rejected a DWI defendant’s attempt to introduce psychiatric evidence of bipolar disorder to negate culpability. Id. at 209-210. Judge Fuentes explained:

[T]he offense of driving while intoxicated precludes the common-law defense of insanity for two reasons. The first is that the statute creating the offense embodies a strong legislative policy of precluding defenses that have a high potential for being pretextual. The second is that driving while intoxicated is an absolute liability offense, a fact that militates against permitting a defense that focuses on a defendant’s lack of mental culpability. . . . . [T]he common-law insanity defense is unavailable to defendants charged with driving under the influence. [Id. at 211, 214.]

Judge Fuentes noted it is irrelevant for defendants to claim that driving under the influence meets the M’Naghten test for common-law insanity because that test focuses on the culpability associated with the defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 213. He wrote, because “[DWI] is a strict liability offense, requiring no culpable mental state,” it is therefore irrelevant whether the defendant “knew or appreciated that driving under the influence was wrong.” Ibid. (citing Hammond, 118 N.J. at 314).

We endorse the holding and reasoning of Inglis, adopting it as precedent.

Second prong

Because the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test has not been met, we do not reach the second prong. Nonetheless, we note the evidence of intoxication was substantial. Defendant admitted to drinking five or six beers, failed field sobriety tests, exhibited classic signs of impairment, and drove his vehicle into a tree. Had counsel presented psychiatric testimony, there remains no realistic likelihood the result of the proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

(Mike Frisch)