“A Lovely Smile”
The Ontario Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division has ordered the interim suspension of an attorney
Łutsel K’e Dene First Nation is in the Northwest Territories. It hired Mirza Mohamad Imram Karim Barlas (also known as Ron Barlas) to manage aspects of its business. A dispute arose between the First Nation and Barlas. The Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories issued a Mareva injunction on April 28, 2023. The effect of the injunction was to freeze Barlas’ assets worldwide.
Two days before the injunction was issued, Barlas transferred $90,000 to the respondent licensee, Andrew Rogerson, as a retainer. Shortly after he received the funds, the respondent knew that they were subject to the injunction. But he refused to return them.
The First Nation applied to the court for an order returning the funds. The court issued a judgement in its favour on March 10, 2025.
In the legal world, it is often a cliché to describe a judgement as “scathing”. Not in this case. Here is an excerpt in which the judge makes findings about the respondent’s litigation conduct:
I have no difficulty finding the following. Refusing to be cross-examined by a female member of the bar, for an invented and meritless reason, and then dismissing her with a sexist remark, is reprehensible. Making a mockery of the obligation to submit to cross-examination is reprehensible. Refusing to properly account for the dissipation of trust funds, much less ones restrained by Court Order, is reprehensible. Ignoring the Court and opposing counsel for months and then interrupting a hearing with a message calculated to precipitate further delay is reprehensible. Using restrained trust funds, in breach of a Court order, to pay for a much larger breach of that Court order is reprehensible.
The judge ordered his reasons to be sent to the Law Society. The Law Society now applies for an interlocutory suspension of the respondent’s licence.
We have reasonable grounds to believe there is a significant risk of harm, both to members of the public and to the public interest in the administration of justice, if the respondent continues to practise law while these investigations continue.
Sexist conduct
The judgement goes on to conclude that the respondent tried to obstruct the conduct of the application. He did this by avoiding inquiries from the applicant’s counsel. He also refused to be cross-examined by the applicant’s counsel, a woman. The judge noted that the respondent said, “really sorry, you’re a nice person, Ms. Kras, you have a lovely smile, I can tell you’re a nice, decent, genuine, person, but you cannot cross-examine me….”
The judge described this remark as sexist and demeaning, noting that the Tribunal had previously disciplined the respondent for sexual harassment.
The appeal determination in the prior matter is linked here and notes
The [Agreed Statement of Facts] indicated that:
• The appellant made references to “hookers” in front of three of his female staff, referring to sex trade workers.
• He made comments about his female receptionist in front of others, asking clients, “Doesn’t my receptionist look good?” He also commented on her age and told her he could not believe how young she looked. This caused her to leave her employment after three months.
• After a telephone encounter with a post office employee, he sent an email to two employees who had unsuccessfully attempted to retrieve a package before turning to him for help. Among other things he told them he had “shouted at both these bitches but it didn’t do any good…. A little bit of power going to the head of people on minimum wage.”
Serious allegations at issue here
The allegations of misappropriating or misapplying trust funds are serious. So are the allegations that the respondent consciously defied a court order and obstructed a court process. If proven, they would demonstrate that the respondent profoundly lacks integrity as a lawyer.
The concerns around integrity would be compounded if it is also shown that the respondent treats women colleagues in a sexist manner.
Interlocutory suspension
In these circumstances, restrictions on the respondent’s licence would be inadequate. The respondent’s integrity and willingness to comply with his professional obligations are in serious issue. We do not see restrictions that will sufficiently address the risks that we have found. If ordered, we cannot be confident that restrictions will be honoured. The protection of the public and the public interest in the administration of justice can only be ensured by suspending the respondent’s licence.
(Mike Frisch)