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Youth Leader Reinstated

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reinstated an attorney who had been disbarred in 2012 retroactive to 2009

[Cappuccio] was admitted to practice law in 2002. [Cappuccio] was hired as a Deputy District Attorney for Bucks County following graduation from law school and was promoted to Chief Deputy District Attorney in 2007. He also served as Chief of the Grand Jury unit and Chief of the Homicide by Vehicle unit.

From about January 2005 until June 2008, [Cappuccio] served as a “Youth Fellowship Group Leader” for a Methodist Church in Perkasie, Pennsylvania. On several occasions from March 2007 through July 2008, he supervised [a group of boys] under the age of 18 from the church youth group and accompanied them to rock concerts. At these concerts[, Cappuccio] purchased and supplied alcoholic beverages to three minors and also smoked marijuana with them. During this same period[, Cappuccio] also attended football games, played pool and went to restaurants accompanied by members of the youth group. The minors were permitted to attend the concerts and remain out late because the parents trusted [Cappuccio] in light of his position as a church youth group leader and as a Chief Deputy District Attorney.

From May through September of 2008, [Cappuccio] engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with [one of the boys, then-16 years old (hereinafter referred to as “victim # 1”)]. The physical relationship began with kissing and eventually escalated to mutual oral sex. The incidents occurred on approximately twelve separate occasions and took place in various public parking lots, the victim’s home, and [Cappuccio’s] home. During this time[, Cappuccio] told victim # 1 not to reveal the relationship to anyone due to the victim’s age and [Cappuccio’s] marriage. The relationship was consensual and the victim was over the legal age of consent relating to sexual offenses as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101, et seq. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1 (defining statutory sexual assault upon person under sixteen years of age).

… [Cappuccio] was confronted by his wife about his relationship with victim # 1. Nevertheless, he continued to engage in the sexual liaison with victim # 1 for several more months.

A criminal investigation was instituted against [Cappuccio] on September 5, 2008, after [Cappuccio] and victim # 1 were discovered by a police officer partially clothed in an automobile parked in a public shopping center. [Cappuccio] resigned from his position at the Bucks County District Attorney’s office the next day.  On September 15, 2008, [Cappuccio] engaged in another sexual encounter with victim # 1 at [Cappuccio’s] home. [Cappuccio] has had no further contact with victim # 1.

As a result of the investigation, a criminal information was filed against [Cappuccio]. On March 10, 2009, [Cappuccio] entered a guilty plea to three counts of endangering the welfare of children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 430[4](a)(1), one count of criminal use of a communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7512(a), three counts of corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1), and three counts of furnishing liquor or malt or brewed beverages to minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1(a). The endangering children and criminal use of a communication facility are offenses classified as felonies of the third degree.

The trial court initially sentenced [Cappuccio] to house arrest for a period of six to twenty-three months, followed by probation. However, [Cappuccio] was re-sentenced to six to twenty-three months in a Bucks County Criminal Facility for the endangering children conviction, five years’ probation for the criminal use of a communication facility, two years’ probation consecutive to the prior counts for the corruption of minors, and no further penalty for furnishing liquor. [Cappuccio] served his incarceration at Northampton County Prison and was released to house arrest on October 15, 2009. [Cappuccio was released from supervision on February 10, 2018.]

The Disciplinary Board had opposed reinstatement but the Court disagreed noting

Collectively, through both reinstatement proceedings, Cappuccio presented the testimony of over a dozen witnesses, including a former New Jersey Superior Court judge, a retired police lieutenant, and several former and current co-workers. Together, these witnesses commented on Cappuccio’s positive rehabilitation, which the 2017 Board described as including “transformational changes.” 2017 Board’s Report and Recommendation, 11/27/17, at 28. See also id. at 23 (“The record is essentially unrefuted, and replete with evidence that during that time frame, [Cappuccio] engaged in qualitative rehabilitation.”). In addition, several witnesses testified to Cappuccio’s professionalism and reputation for being truthful and law-abiding.

Thus

Through, inter alia, his meaningful self-reflection and decade and a half of qualitative rehabilitation, Cappuccio has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that he “is not predisposed to commit future ethical infractions[,]” Costigan, 664 A.2d at 520, and has “the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law required for admission to practice law in this Commonwealth and that” his resumption of the practice of law within this Commonwealth “will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive of the public interest.” Rule 218(c)(3). See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct., 363 A.2d 779, 780–81 (Pa. 1976) (“A reinstatement proceeding is a searching inquiry into a lawyer’s present professional and moral fitness to resume the practice of law. The object of concern is not solely the transgressions which gave rise to the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment, but rather the nature and extent of the rehabilitative efforts he has made since the time the sanctions were imposed, and the degree of success achieved in the rehabilitative process.” (footnote omitted)).

For these reasons, we reject the recommendation of the Board and grant Cappuccio’s petition for reinstatement. We further order Cappuccio to pay the costs associated with processing his petition pursuant to Pa.R.D.E. 218(f)(2).

(Mike Frisch)