Tardy Lawyer Denied Due Process

The Wyoming Supreme Court overturned a finding of indirect criminal contempt and $100 fine of a defense attorney who was late for court

It is worth noting that “Wyoming stands alone as the only jurisdiction to have a court rule that empowers district and circuit court judges to enforce standards of professional behavior on the part of lawyers who appear before them. Rule 801 . . . has been in effect since January 1, 2013.” Mark W. Gifford, Rule 801(a) Revisited: Court Enforced Standards of Professional Behavior, 45 Wyo. Law. 10 (2022). We have not previously addressed the nature of a Rule 801 sanction. Codifying the courts’ authority to hold attorneys to certain standards of behavior does not change the inherent nature of the action taken by the court. The substance of the court’s order—its effect—prevails over its designation. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13–14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) (“[Fed. R. Crim. P.] 42(a) was not an innovation. It did not confer power upon district judges not possessed prior to March 21, 1946. ‘This rule,’ the Advisory Committee on the rules of criminal procedure stated, ‘is substantially a restatement of existing law.’” (citation omitted)). Rule 801 is substantially a restatement of existing law. The sanction under Rule 801 in this case was the indirect criminal contempt sanction.

The failure to adhere to the due process requirements of indirect criminal contempt is a fatal jurisdictional defect. See supra 

FENN, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that the district court’s order must be reversed. However, I reach that conclusion because the district court did not give Mr. Goetz notice he allegedly violated U.R.D.C. 801(a)(5), as required by U.R.D.C. 801(a)(8), before imposing the monetary sanction. I believe this Court should decline to address whether the district court properly held Mr. Goetz in contempt, and I disagree with the majority’s conclusion the monetary sanction the district court imposed under U.R.D.C. 801(a)(5) amounted to criminal contempt.

Power

…the majority’s conclusion that the imposition of non-compensatory monetary sanctions amounts to criminal contempt overlooks the various sources from which a court derives its authority to issue sanctions. See ¶¶11–12. A court’s power to “impose sanctions against recalcitrant lawyers” comes from numerous sources including statutes, rules, and common law. Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., Inc., 775 F.2d 1440, 1446 (11th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7  Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L. Ed. 259 (1812) (“Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution. . . . To fine for contempt—imprison for contumacy— inforce [sic] the observance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: . . .”). We have recognized courts have the inherent authority to enforce their orders through sanctions. 

No criminal contempt

Although the district court imposed a non-compensatory monetary sanction in this case under U.R.D.C. 801, that sanction did not amount to criminal contempt. Instead, the district court had authority under its inherent powers and U.R.D.C. 901 and 801 to impose a monetary sanction for Mr. Goetz’s tardiness. However, the district court did not notify Mr. Goetz he was being charged with a violation of U.R.D.C. 801 or give him an opportunity to respond to that allegation prior to issuing the sanction, as required by U.R.D.C. 801(a)(8). Therefore, I agree the district court’s order must be reversed due to a lack of notice, but I disagree with any ruling saying the monetary sanction constitutes criminal contempt.

(Mike Frisch)