Fee Request Reduced By Half

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Bates) significantly reduced the fee award sought after five years of litigation

Months ago, this Court “surmise[d] that the total for five years of legal fees” the plaintiffs to this case had shouldered “exceeds the $203,102.10 [they] will recover from” defendant Omni Shoreham Corporation. Inova Health Care Servs. for Inova Fairfax Hosp. & Its Dep’t, Life with Cancer v. Omni Shoreham Corp. (“Inova VIII”), Civ. A. No. 20-784 (JDB), 2024 WL 5158796, at *19 n.14 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2024). It turns out that supposition was an understatement. Plaintiffs now ask to recover from Omni $1,302,200.80 in legal fees. For a host of reasons explained below, that amount of fees is unreasonable, and the Court instead awards Plaintiffs $743,184.54. The large amount that Omni will have to pay and the remainder of the hefty fees that Plaintiffs will have to bear are—like the rest of this case—“a reminder that a client’s best interest is not always served by uncompromising litigation.” Id.

The underlying dispute

Here’s the short of it. Inova Fairfax Hospital and its Department, Life with Cancer and Smith Center for Healing and the Arts (together, “Plaintiffs”) contracted with Omni to host the September 2019 “Joan Hisaoka ‘Make a Difference’ Gala” (the “Gala”), an annual fundraiser for cancer organizations including Plaintiffs. Inova VIII, 2024 WL 5158796, at *1. The contract (the “Agreement”) identified specific ballrooms in which the Gala was to be held. Id. Nonetheless, Omni informed Plaintiffs just over a month before the Gala that it was moving the event from the contracted-for ballrooms to other, less ideal ballrooms. Id. Omni, it turned out, had disregarded the preexisting Agreement and entered into an event contract with the Embassy of Lebanon for Plaintiffs’ chosen ballrooms on the same date. Inova Health Care Servs. for Inova Fairfax Hosp. & Its Dep’t, Life with Cancer v. Omni Shoreham Corp. (“Inova VI”), Civ. A. No. 20-784 (JDB), 2023 WL 5206142, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2023). Plaintiffs ultimately held the Gala at a different hotel as a result. Id.

After recounting the litigation history

The question is thus whether Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing they are entitled to more than $1.3 million in fees and expenses. Omni says no, raising an armada of red flags that it argues reveal that the “Court should only award Plaintiffs a fraction of their requested fees.” Opp’n at 2. The Court in large part agrees. The documentation and attendant rationales that Plaintiffs put forward not only fail to satisfy their burden of establishing reasonableness but show that a large majority of their “fee request is not only . . . excessive,” but “plagued with deficiencies.” Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. Wolf, Civ. A. No. 20-2348 (DLF), 2024 WL 4227617, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2024). The Court will thus award Plaintiffs only one half of the sum they request for the time of their counsel (“Counsel”). The Court will, however, award Plaintiffs most of the expenses they request.

Before beginning, the Court notes that just last April it reminded the parties that “[a] request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Yet considering they filed in conjunction with this fee request over 115 pages of briefing and over 415 pages of exhibits (including two purported expert reports), it appears the parties did not take that reminder to heart. Indeed, much of their briefing consists of finger pointing and rehashing old debates about who is to blame for this litigious mess. The Court declines to involve itself in such school-yard skirmishes. It will instead address only the parties’ substantive arguments.

The court declined to consider a purported expert report offered by plaintiffs

It is largely a retelling of Plaintiffs’ arguments as to the reasonableness of their litigation strategy, spiced with some summaries of the Court’s own docket, caselaw, and flat conclusory statements.

Block billing

In short, Counsel’s incessant block billing precludes the Court from “determin[ing] with a high degree of certainty” that the hours spent on this litigation were reasonable. See In re Olson, 884 F.2d at 1429. Of course, not every block-billed entry is so prohibitive, and the Court  can see that some of Counsel’s time was reasonably spent. But the extensive blocking together of undetailed entries does not permit the Court to determine whether the amount of hours Plaintiffs submit is reasonable, and the Court will significantly decrease Plaintiffs’ award for attorney hours accordingly.

Reduction was imposed for claims that did not succeed.

Rasonableness

Trudging onward, Omni argues that Plaintiffs’ requested hours should be substantially reduced because Mahoney’s hours were excessive for the work he performed. Attorneys are entitled to compensation only for “reasonable” expenditures of time, and a court must “exclude hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Louise Trauma Ctr., 2023 WL 3478479, at *6. From the outset, the total number of hours Mahoney billed on this litigation—over 1,900—hints at excessiveness. To be fair, Mahoney did nearly all the work for Plaintiffs’ case over five years (an issue the Court will discuss momentarily). But even considering that he was working nearly alone, the amount of hours he spent on certain tasks was excessive. Omni highlights that Mahoney billed 59 hours for researching and drafting the original complaint, 16 hours drafting discovery responses, and 47 hours (in just two weeks) for researching and writing a motion to dismiss opposition. See Opp’n at 19–20; Decl. of C. Stephen Setliff [ECF No. 1451] (“Setliff Decl.”) at 8–9 (list of all Mahoney’s “excessive hours” compiled by Omni). Two things make these hours excessive. First, this case was not all that complicated. For most of the past five years, this litigation was simply a breach of a contract dispute between arms-length parties. This was not litigation between scores of parties with scores of claims or that involved a complex statutory or regulatory scheme and implicated novel legal questions— despite the parties’ constant attempts to treat it as such. Second, Mahoney is a partner with more than three decades of experience. As Omni points out, “[t]he primary reason for hiring experienced attorneys like Mr. Mahoney who can bill higher rates is they are presumably able to accomplish things quicker based on [their] experience.” Opp’n at 20. It may take an associate 60 hours to compile a 16-page breach of contract complaint, but one would not expect it to take a veteran litigator that long.

Delegation

Having a senior partner conduct most of the work on a case may be strategic—if it results in a more efficient use of time because of the partner’s expertise. But as the Court has explained, Mahoney did not always accomplish associate-level tasks in less time than an associate would. So it’s hard to see how the decision to have Mahoney take on the overwhelming majority of the work at his high billing rate was reasonable. The Court will therefore decrease the lodestar to account for the overbilling that resulted from partners doing associate-level work.

Reduction

A 50 percent reduction—in addition to Counsel’s discount—is also warranted because it results in an award more in line with the results obtained in this case. It’s true that putting aside Plaintiffs’ dismissed claims, Counsel obtained a favorable liability ruling on Plaintiffs’ remaining claims. When it came to damages, however, Counsel’s victory was far from complete. As amended, the jury awarded Plaintiffs $203,102.10. See Order [ECF No. 137] at 12. Counsel recognizes that this award amounts to “54% of the minimum amount [Plaintiffs] sought.” Reply at 3 (emphasis added). But it is only 45% of the maximum amount they sought. See Pls.’ Pretrial Statement [ECF No. 104] at 11. Plus, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ post-trial request for prejudgment interest because Counsel failed to put the issue to the jury as required. Inova VIII, 2024 WL 5158796, at *15–16. And all of this was after years of pricey litigation driven by each side’s tactics, including Counsel’s settlement offers that failed in part because of the lofty attorneys’ fees demanded. See Opp’n at 3. Given the only moderate success Counsel obtained for Plaintiffs, the Court finds an award of 50 percent of what was billed is reasonable.

So the Court will award Plaintiffs $503,856.26—half of the amount of fees they requested for attorney hours.

The court declined to award fees for the rejected expert report. (Mike Frisch)