Trial Strategy: Make Witnesses “Go To Sleep”

The Arkansas Supreme Court has disbarred an attorney based on multiple findings of ethics violations

In total, the Committee [on Professional Conduct] alleged 176 violations of the Rules stemming from Bloodman’s conduct in at least fifteen separate matters. The disbarment proceedings were bifurcated into two phases. The first phase was the allegations phase, and the hearing took place across several dates from 2018 through early 2019. The forty-two-volume record for the allegations phase spans over 7,700 pages. On May 9, 2023, the special judge entered findings of facts and conclusions of law wherein he detailed his findings over 236 pages. The second phase was the sanctions phase, and the hearing took place on June 22 and August 21, 2023. On February 2, 2024, the special judge entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of sanction, wherein he recommended that Bloodman be disbarred. Upon a review of the record, we accept the special judge’s findings and recommendation.

Respondent has been suspended on an interim basis since 2016 and had claimed a due process violation

the special judge did not err in finding that Bloodman’s procedural due process arguments had been brought to finality in Bloodman v. Ligon, supra, and we decline to reconsider our earlier ruling.

Service of process was also challenged

After hearing arguments from the parties and testimony from Bloodman and [process server] Myers, the special judge denied Bloodman’s motion to dismiss, finding that service was proper. In reaching this decision, the special judge weighed the credibility of the witnesses and ultimately determined that, in light of the affidavit of service, Bloodman failed to carry her burden of proving that service was improper. On August 8, the special judge entered a written order memorializing his findings. During a short recess at the July 19 hearing, in the presence of at least three witnesses, Bloodman was personally served in the courtroom with a box containing the same materials that Myers testified to leaving on her doorstep on May 18—the summons, original petition for disbarment, and related exhibits.

Merits

From the pleadings, the entire record, and the evidence admitted during the allegations phase of Bloodman’s disbarment hearing, the special judge found that 121 of the 176 counts brought by the Committee alleging violations of the Rules had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The Rule violations stemmed from Bloodman’s conduct  in at least fifteen separate matters. From our review of the record, we cannot say that the special judge’s findings are clearly erroneous.

To be sure, the magnitude of Bloodman’s misconduct as outlined in the special judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and proved through a voluminous record of evidence and witness testimony is troubling. Among Bloodman’s many proven violations, there were sixteen violations wherein Bloodman knowingly engaged in dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation, and twenty-five violations wherein Bloodman’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. The evidence demonstrates that, among other things, Bloodman has exhibited a pattern of making false statements to courts and disobeying court orders; collecting substantial legal fees, often five-figure sums, from her clients and failing to provide commensurate legal representation before withdrawing as counsel and failing to refund any portion of the unearned fees; mishandling and prolonging criminal appeals to such an unreasonable degree that the entire court of appeals referred her to the Office of Professional Conduct; and utilizing her law license as a means to delay proceedings and frustrate the legal process in bad faith in pursuit of personal matters. Moreover, Bloodman continued to practice law after her license had been suspended. Though, perhaps one of the most illustrative examples highlighting the extent of Bloodman’s misconduct involves her representation of Kenneth Brown, Jr.

Brown was charged with involvement in a drug trafficking operation

In the course of Bloodman’s representation of Brown, Bloodman and Brown discussed the list of witnesses who had already negotiated plea agreements and were cooperating with the government against Brown, including Brown’s co-defendants. In October 2013, Brown made a recorded telephone-conference call from jail to several contacts including his mother, sister, and another associate, discussing with them a suggestion made to him that he could arrange for persons not in custody to kill certain adverse witnesses to improve his position in his federal case. When asked about the source of this suggestion at Bloodman’s disbarment hearing, Brown testified that Bloodman had advised him several times that he could “beat his charges” if he could make government-cooperating witnesses “go to sleep,” which Brown asserted both parties understood to mean killing the witnesses.

Respondent had sought, among other things, a second continuance

In the days leading up to trial, Bloodman filed several motions. On April 3, she filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to continue the April 7 trial. The same day, she filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude most, if not all, evidence against Brown on the basis that it was prejudicial. On April 4, Bloodman filed a motion to withdraw as Brown’s counsel. She explained that she had not been adequately compensated for her representation of Brown, despite his earlier payment of the full $25,000 fee, and asserted that the superseding indictment had changed their contractual arrangement and allegedly caused her undue hardship. Bloodman was allowed to withdraw from the case, and counsel from the federal public defender’s office was appointed to represent Brown going forward. Assistant United States Attorney Chris Givens, the lead prosecutor on Brown’s case, testified at Bloodman’s disbarment hearing that it was clear to him from the beginning of this case that Bloodman was very unfamiliar with federal law and that she was often nonresponsive to his  communications. Givens testified further that Bloodman was relieved from the case because she was unprepared, and the court did not believe she would ever be prepared. Prior to the court’s ruling on Bloodman’s motion to withdraw, Bloodman did not disclose to the court that she had devoted substantial time and effort to other cases in which she was pursuing personal interests—including a case filed by Bloodman pro se involving her minor son’s participation on his school’s basketball team and a case in which she challenged and appealed to exhaustion a $250 sanction imposed against her due to her failure to comply with a court order—during the continuance period between December 2013 and April 2014.

After Bloodman withdrew from Brown’s case, Brown wrote to Givens from jail. He explained that he thought Bloodman had been ready to go to trial on April 7 as scheduled, and that he had been following Bloodman’s lead since day one. Further, Brown wrote that he had wanted to speak to Givens, but Bloodman had kept him from doing so, assuring Brown that she could “beat it.” Brown also wrote to Judge Leon Holmes asking what he could do about the $25,000 fee that his family and friends had collected and paid Bloodman to represent him. Givens testified at Bloodman’s disbarment hearing that, by the time Brown eventually entered a guilty plea in December 2014, he was the last to do so among the eleven defendants originally charged.

Mitigation and aggravation

Special Judge Smith found that the following aggravating factors applied: (1) a pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple offenses; and a (3) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct. Specifically, the special judge noted that Bloodman demonstrated a pattern of misconduct for more than five years prior to the interim suspension and committed 121 separate violations of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct, all while denying having violated even one Rule. Conversely, Special Judge Smith found that the following mitigating factors applied: (1) the absence of a prior disciplinary record; and (2) a delay in the disciplinary proceedings.

The court

In light of the record and our discussion above, it is clear that Bloodman has engaged in systematic abuse of the legal system for years, both personally and professionally. Bloodman’s misconduct across the fifteen separate matters yielded 121 violations of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct involving “serious misconduct,” and was thoroughly detailed in the special judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. This misconduct seriously undermines the confidence that the public places in the legal profession. See Tapp, supra. The proven violations are further exacerbated by the fact that the evidence demonstrates an ongoing pattern of misconduct in the years leading up to, and at times persisting after, the interim suspension of Bloodman’s license to practice law, and that Bloodman has not acknowledged the wrongful nature of her conduct. We therefore accept Judge Smith’s recommendation and enter an order of disbarment.

Order of disbarment issued.

Yahoo! Sports reported on the lawsuit involving

An Arkansas mother has sued her son’s high school for cutting her son from the school’s varsity basketball team, claiming that he was deprived the right of a full education because he was not allowed to take part in school athletics.

As reported by Arkansas Matters and USA Today, among other sources, Teresa Bloodman, the mother of a Maumelle (Ark.) High freshman, filed suit against the school, district and state after her son was replaced on the school’s basketball team following a third set of tryouts for the team that re-incorporated members of the school’s football team.

Bloodman’s son, who is a minor and was not named in the suit, spent two months as part of the team after qualifying through two tryouts in August only to be replaced three months later by a member of the football team, as were nine of the team’s 11 original players.

While those replacements might stoke claims of favoritism, the lawsuit filed by Bloodman goes much further, claiming that her son has a constitutional right to participate in school sports, as you can read in the excerpt from the suit directly below.

“…the deprivation of the right to a full and complete education which includes competition in sports and consequently athletic scholarships impairs John Doe of a property right guaranteed under both the U.S. and State Constitutions.”

The suit further alleges that the sheer lack of an orderly appeals process for students who were cut is also a violation of due process.

While the case itself could serve as a watershed in how schools hold tryouts for varsity sports, the attorney for the Pulaski County Special School District is confident that it will be seen as groundless once it is further examined in a court of law.

“The simple issue here is whether or not a student has a right to participate in extracurricular activities; be it band, choir or whatever,” Pulaski County Special School District attorney Jay Bequette told Arkansas Matters. “There is no clearly established right of parents to have their children compete in interscholastic athletics.”

(Mike Frisch)