What About?

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of relief to a defendant based on his attorney’s deficient advice

This appeal concerns Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which governs whether an attorney’s performance was deficient or fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and whether such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant as a result. Appellant Edwin Leo Brown rejected a plea deal after his attorney provided erroneous advice as to his sentencing exposure. The district court found—and the government concedes—Brown’s attorney performed deficiently. However, the district court ultimately found Brown failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney.

As such, the only question before us is whether Brown was prejudiced by his attorney’s shortcomings, i.e., if there was a “reasonable probability” Brown would have accepted the plea deal if properly advised. Finding Brown has sufficiently established he was prejudiced by his attorney’s shortcomings, we reverse the district court’s denial of relief, remand the case, and require the government to re-offer Brown the same plea agreements.

Facts

In February 2017, Brett Wentz entered his appearance as Brown’s counsel. J.A. 11. Wentz and Brown discussed the most recent plea agreements that Harper had procured for Brown, and Wentz affirmed that Brown would face a statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment if he accepted the plea offer. See J.A. 582.

However, Wentz nonetheless advised Brown “that for sentencing purposes, it did not matter whether he accepted the plea agreement because the guideline range would be the same.” J.A. 182. In other words, Wentz advised Brown that he would be facing a statutory maximum of ten years’ imprisonment regardless of whether he accepted a plea offer or not. See id. Operating under this guidance, Brown rejected the plea offers shortly before his Rule 11 hearing. J.A. 547–48.

Denial below

the district court erred in finding Lee applied in the context of rejected pleas and Brown was required to present “contemporaneous evidence” to support his claim that he would have accepted the government’s plea offer.

RUSHING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Edwin Brown rejected a plea deal that would have exposed him to a maximum of ten years in prison. Instead, he chose to plead guilty without a deal and was sentenced to over seventeen years. Now he says he would’ve taken the deal if his third attorney had properly advised him. The district court was not required to accept Brown’s assertion at face value. The court held an evidentiary hearing, where Brown and two of his former attorneys testified. After assessing the witnesses’ credibility and weighing all the evidence, the district court believed the attorneys, who testified that they advised Brown to take the deal but he refused because he didn’t want to waive his right to appeal.

Despite identifying no clear error in the district court’s factual findings, the majority reverses the district court. The majority finds a reasonable probability that Brown would’ve accepted the plea deal because (1) he says he would have, and (2) his ultimate sentence was longer than the sentence available under the deal.  What about the contrary evidence and the district court’s factual findings? The majority disregards them. What about the Supreme Court’s admonition to “look to contemporaneous evidence” to substantiate a defendant’s post hoc assertions? Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017). The majority rejects it as unnecessary in the context of declined plea deals, despite this Court’s precedent to the contrary. I respectfully dissent.

(Mike Frisch)