Threatening Letter Draws Sanction

The New Hampshire Supreme Court denied a joint motion for clarification and affirmed the disposition in a matter where a six-month suspension with four months stayed was imposed for a Rule 4.4(a) violation set forth in a decision of the Professional Conduct Committee

Specifically, on May 20, 2019, Attorney Hoppock sent a demand letter to an unrepresented party, Brandie Roof, that contained statements threatening financial ruin, threatening that he and his client would “pursue [her] until [she] ha[d] nothing left, except assets exempt from judicial execution,” making assertions about the “legal consequences that would befall” her, and representing that a $250,000 settlement demand was “generous.”

The first Hearing Panel, in an order dated January 4, 2022, found that the Attorney Discipline Office (the “ADO”) had not met its burden to prove a knowing violation of Rule 4.4(a) by clear and convincing evidence. The ADO appealed the Panel’s finding to the Committee.

After the appeal there was a remand

The second Hearing Panel, in an order dated October 25, 2023, made detailed factual findings on factors relevant to sanction. It determined that the appropriate sanction was a six-month suspension, stayed for two years on certain conditions. Both parties have asked the Committee to review this decision.

Intent required 

Attorney Hoppock was well aware of the words he used in the letter and he knew that Ms. Roof was unrepresented. Thus, he had “conscious awareness of the . . . attendant circumstances” surrounding the letter. See ABA Standards, Sec. III (“Definitions”).

In addition, as the Hearing Panel emphasized, Attorney Hoppock had a heightened knowledge of the context of his actions and Rule 4.4(a), to an extent that many attorneys would not have shared. Attorney Hoppock previously admitted to violating Rule 4.4(a) not quite two years prior to sending the letter5. While prior disciplinary history is not usually relevant in the sanctions analysis until the consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, in the unique circumstances of this case the evidence of prior disciplinary history bears directly on the state of mind factor. In the prior case, Attorney Hoppock admitted that his comments increased the friction between the parties, acknowledged that his choice of words was counterproductive, and agreed that he personally attacked the opposing party and opposing counsel in a way that potentially damaged his clients’ interests. He admitted that his conduct violated Rule 4.4(a) and he asserted in that proceeding that he was now “well-educated on New Hampshire’s Rule 4.4.” Given that the standard looks to the lawyer’s knowledge “that he [or she] is violating a court . . . rule,” the Committee agrees with the Hearing Panel that the evidence here showed that Attorney Hoppock acted knowingly in that regard.

Sanction

The Committee thus concludes that the appropriate sanction is a six-month suspension from the practice of law, two months of which are imposed and four months of which are stayed.

The court’s opinion affirmed the finding of the violation and sanction. (Mike Frisch)