Reprimand Rejected

The Georgia Supreme Court rejected a Respondent’s proposed public reprimand for a misdemeanor guilty plea by a former County Solicitor General

In her petition, Woodard states that, on June 18, 2024, she was indicted by a Hall County Grand Jury on 24 felony counts of criminal misconduct, which was comprised of 13 counts involving alleged 2 violations of OCGA § 16-10-201 and 11 counts involving alleged violations of OCGA § 16-8-2.2 The 24 counts alleged that, on 11 occasions, Woodard—while serving as the Solicitor General of the Hall County State Court—made requests and received  violations of OCGA § 16-10-201 and 11 counts involving alleged violations of OCGA § 16-8-2.2 The 24 counts alleged that, on 11 occasions, Woodard—while serving as the Solicitor General of the Hall County State Court—made requests and received reimbursement for expenses which were not official expenses for which she was entitled to reimbursement. Specifically, Counts 1-11 related to reimbursements from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council, the circumstances of which Woodard contends she has “scant information,” but believes may have resulted because she improperly sought reimbursement from both the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and Hall County. Counts 12 and 13 related to an improper charge for the cremation of a dog, which Woodard contends was an inadvertent and improper charge. Counts 14 and 15 related to cleaning supplies provided to someone Woodard was rehoming, which she contends was a legitimate reimbursement request pursuant to the Legal Victim Assistance Program and which resulted in an indictment because of the State’s misunderstanding of the Program. Counts 16 and 17 related to a meal at a restaurant, which Woodard also contends was a legitimate reimbursement request. Counts 18-223 related to an improper charge for an LSAT prep course for Woodard’s daughter, which she contends happened because someone on her staff saw the receipt and mistakenly pursued reimbursement. Counts 23 and 244 related to a pillow purchased for Woodard’s son, which she contends happened because she mistakenly used the wrong credit card. In total, the amount of misappropriated funds was $2,219.28 (with $1,190.48 from the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council and $1,028.80 from Hall County).

Following the indictment, Woodard and the State began negotiations and agreed that the matter would be best settled by a nolle prosequi of the felony charges and Woodard entering a guilty plea to one misdemeanor count of a violation of OCGA § 45-11-4 (b) (1) and (5). According to Woodard, the State was concerned as to whether there was sufficient evidence to prove scienter or intent, as required for the indicted felony charges. Nevertheless, as Woodard admitted that her conduct constituted a breach of her duty as a public official, such that there was enough showing of criminal culpability to sustain a misdemeanor conviction under OCGA § 4511-4, she entered her guilty plea under the First Offender Act and received 12 months on probation, which was to be terminated upon full and timely payment of restitution.

The court

Although the State Bar supports Woodard’s request for a public reprimand, we do not agree that a public reprimand for Woodard’s violations of Rules 8.4 (a) (3) and (4) is sufficient as “a penalty to the offender, a deterrent to others, and an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.” See In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981) (cleaned up). As an initial matter, we have explained that “a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) is among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be charged.” In the Matter of West, 300 Ga. 777, 778 (798 SE2d 219) (2017). We have also explained that for a Rule 8.4 (a) (3) violation “either suspension or disbarment is an appropriate sanction, depending on the circumstances.” In the Matter of Gardner, 286 Ga. 623, 624 (690 SE2d 611) (2010). Further, as a public official,  Woodard was in a position of power and responsibility, and when considering the appropriate sanction to impose “[t]his Court is . . . concerned . . . about the public’s confidence in the profession.” In the Matter of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690, 692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011). See also In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865, 867 (621 SE2d 750) (2005) (noting in aggravation that the attorney’s misconduct “arose out of his actions as an elected public official”).

Rejected

Because Woodard’s case is more akin to cases which resulted in 6-month and 18-month suspensions than to cases which resulted in a public reprimand, we are rejecting Woodard’s petition without prejudice to allow her to file a renewed petition seeking voluntary discipline more consistent with the cases we cite as applicable.

(Mike Frisch)