No Suspension For Neglect Of Appeals

An attorney’s neglect of several appellate matters drew a reprimand from the Iowa Supreme Court

This matter raises the question of the appropriate sanction for an attorney who admittedly failed to comply with appellate deadlines in numerous appeals over a period of almost four years. We conclude a public reprimand is the appropriate remedy here, but we caution that, going forward, an attorney’s repeated failure to comply with the appellate deadlines may warrant suspension.

From December 2019 through October 2023, attorney Karmen Anderson failed to act diligently in twenty-four appellate matters. In those twenty-four cases, Anderson missed forty-two appellate filing deadlines, was issued twenty-four default notices by the clerk of the appellate court, and was removed from four of those cases by this court. She paid the accrued $150 penalties assessed for each default, totaling $3,600. Although Anderson’s conduct delayed or potentially delayed the disposition of these appeals, none were dismissed due to her lack of diligence.

Respondent did not contest the misconduct findings 

The parties do contest the appropriate sanction for Anderson’s conduct. Anderson argues that a public reprimand is appropriate. However, she requests that if we conclude that suspension of her license is appropriate, the court suspend her license for no more than thirty days instead of the recommended forty-five days. The Board contends that the court should suspend Anderson’s license for thirty days and requests that the court require Anderson to complete continuing legal education regarding law practice management as a condition to reinstatement.

Mitigation

She was twice infected with COVID-19 and had long-term symptoms from those infections, including memory problems and fatigue. She also suffered from appendicitis and had to undergo an appendectomy. Anderson also had familial stressors. She and her husband moved overseas for a period of time due to his work, and she was forced to work remotely. When she returned to the country, she and her husband fostered a young man with Down syndrome who required constant care and supervision. While we have empathy for Anderson’s personal circumstances, we conclude that these circumstances are only mildly mitigating here, if at all. The Board persuasively showed that these personal issues did not have a strong correlation, if any, to the deadlines Anderson missed.

Although Anderson’s personal circumstances are only mildly mitigating, if at all, there are other mitigating considerations here. Anderson accepted court-appointed work and did work for low-income clients. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Heggen, 981 N.W.2d 701, 713 (Iowa 2022) (concluding that the attorney’s provision of legal services to an “underserved and vulnerable population” was a mitigating factor). She completed pro bono work on a regular basis. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Said, 869 N.W.2d 185, 194–95 (Iowa 2015) (discussing pro bono work). She participated in the expungement clinic and volunteered to judge moot court. Anderson is active in community service, serving on the board of Tandem Services, a company that places intellectually disabled adults in family homes. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hier, 937 N.W.2d 309, 318 (Iowa 2020) (discussing community service). The “key mitigating factor” in this case, however, is the lack of prejudice to Anderson’s clients. Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 645; see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Boles, 808 N.W.2d 431, 442 (Iowa 2012). None of the appeals at issue were dismissed due to Anderson’s conduct. See Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 641. No client filed a complaint with the Board. Anderson paid the penalty assessments associated with the notices of default. Generally, we are reluctant to suspend attorneys “solely for default notices cured without dismissal of the appeal.” Id. at 645

Second reprimand

While we conclude a second public reprimand is the appropriate sanction consistent with our precedents, we note that missing deadlines is not consistent with the duties required of Iowa lawyers and that, going forward, suspension may be appropriate in future cases involving this type of wholesale neglect of filing deadlines. “[U]sing the appellate clerk’s notices of default ‘as a private tickler system is unacceptable behavior for an attorney.’ ” Tindal, 949 N.W.2d at 642 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 862 N.W.2d 627, 642 (Iowa 2015)).

(Mike Frisch)