Judgmental Immunity

The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the judgmental immunity doctrine had been misapplied by the Court of Appeals but nonetheless held in favor of defendant Barnes & Thornburg in a legal malpractice case

The court [of appeals] also emphasized that Leonard “was a seasoned litigator with experience litigating issues in both Georgia and New York” and that this experience formed the basis for his opinion that Georgia law was more favorable to Cox-Ott’s position; on that basis, the court concluded that Leonard could not be held liable for his decision to proceed under Georgia law. Id. at 623 (2) (a) (i).

But the mere fact that an attorney’s judgment is based on his experience does not automatically establish that the attorney exercised reasonable care in reaching that judgment such that he should be insulated from liability. Accordingly, in determining whether Cox-Ott had established the requisite element of her malpractice claim, the Court of Appeals erred by considering only whether Leonard “engaged in an honest exercise of professional judgment,” but instead should have determined, under the circumstances of this case, whether Leonard exercised reasonable care in reaching that judgment. Therefore, because it does not rest on an accurate statement of the law of professional legal malpractice in Georgia, we disapprove those portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision relying on the doctrine of judgmental immunity in affirming the grant of summary judgment in this case.

Nevertheless, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in this case. Besides concluding that Cox-Ott’s claims were barred by judgmental immunity, the Court of Appeals also held that Cox-Ott failed to establish the causation element of her professional malpractice claim. See Cox-Ott, 370 Ga. App. at 624-626 (2) (a) (i)(ii). Cox-Ott did not ask us to review this independent ground for affirmance of the judgment against it, nor did we grant certiorari to address it, so we do not disturb it. As a result, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed on that basis. 

The case

Cox-Ott consulted with Leonard in connection with a dispute with an insurer regarding the premium amount on a life insurance policy that was taken out to fund Cox-Ott’s family trust. Following his own investigation into the dispute, Leonard discussed potential paths forward with Cox-Ott, and it was his understanding that CoxOtt wanted to enforce the policy. Leonard thereafter outlined two potential strategies in a letter he sent to Cox-Ott, though Cox-Ott denied receiving this letter. Leonard explained that, in his opinion, the insurer could agree either to rescind the policy and return the premiums or to reform the policy to one better suited to Cox-Ott’s needs.

After the insurer refused to reform the policy, Leonard recommended filing suit against the insurer, raising claims for fraud and reformation of the policy. The suit could have been brought in either Georgia or New York, and Leonard recommended that suit be brought in Georgia. According to Leonard, his recommendation was based on his experience that New York courts were “not as favorable to policyholders because there are so many major insurers . . . headquartered there, and NY law isn’t as favorable . . . as Georgia,” as “most calls go to the insurers, and not the insureds.”

Leonard subsequently brought suit against the insurer in Georgia on behalf of the family trust, asserting state law claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and reformation. The insurer removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, which the district court granted, finding that “the trust affirmed the policy by seeking its reformation” and that the merger clause contained within the affirmed policy barred the trust’s fraud claims. See C & C Family Trust 04/04/05 ex rel. Cox-Ott v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 44 FSupp3d 1247, 1256-1259 (B) (2) (N.D. Ga. 2014). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal. See C&C Family Tr. v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 654 Fed. Appx. 429 (11th Cir. 2016).

Cox-Ott, individually and as trustee for her family trust, then sued Leonard and Barnes & Thornburg for professional negligence, asserting that Leonard was negligent for electing to proceed under Georgia law rather than New York law and for asserting a claim for reformation rather than rescission, among other reasons. The trial court ultimately entered summary judgment against Cox-Ott, finding that the judgmental immunity doctrine precluded Cox-Ott’s professional negligence claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that Cox-Ott’s claims were barred by judgmental immunity, which it said “protects an attorney from liability for acts and omissions in the conduct of litigation which are based on an honest exercise of professional judgment.” See Cox-Ott v. Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, 370 Ga. App. 615, 620, 622-626 (2) (a) (i)-(ii) (898 SE2d 619) (2024). In particular, the Court of Appeals held that research into the choice of law issue was not required in order for Leonard’s decision to be protected by judgmental immunity and that Leonard’s recommendation as to venue was similarly protected because of his expertise and experience. Id. at 622-623 (2) (a) (i). The court also held that Leonard’s recommendation to pursue reformation rather than rescission was likewise protected since it was “an honest exercise of professional judgment.” Id. at 625 (2) (a) (ii). Finally, the court concluded that, irrespective of judgmental immunity, Cox-Ott could not establish the causation element of her professional negligence claims. Id. at 624 (2) (a) (i), 627-628 (2) (b). Thereafter, we granted Cox-Ott’s petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether “the doctrine of judgmental immunity applied by the Court of Appeals correctly state[s] the law of Georgia with respect to professional negligence claims against attorneys[.]”

(Mike Frisch)