Criminal Prosecutor Not Subject To Civil Sanctions

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed sanctions imposed on a prosecutor for misconduct found in his handling of an operating while intoxicated case

The district court granted a criminal defendant’s motion to impose monetary sanctions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 against an assistant county attorney for misconduct while prosecuting a criminal charge. The assistant county attorney filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the sanctions. In this case, we review an order that appears to be unprecedented in Iowa—one imposing monetary sanctions against a prosecutor in a criminal case.

Trial court

The district court ultimately concluded that Christensen had engaged in sanctionable conduct in violation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 and Iowa Code § 619.19 (2023) by filing the motion in limine and by dismissing the case for an improper purpose. The district court ultimately entered a $2,072 monetary sanction against Christensen. The district court determined that Christensen failed to carry his burden to show an inability to pay a monetary sanction and that the amount reflected the need for deterrence based on the unique role of the prosecutor in our justice system. Christensen thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and we granted review of the petition.

Civil sanction are inapplicable

“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.8 cmt. [1]. As then-Attorney General Robert Jackson said, “The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America,” thus “[w]hile the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.” Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor 1 (Apr. 1, 1940). But courts (and the 10 voting public) are not without other tools to hold prosecutors accountable, including “vigorous judicial oversight in the district court, appellate review, postconviction-relief proceedings, attorney disciplinary proceedings, human resource management, and elections.” Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792, 803 (Iowa 2019). What’s more, our rules of professional conduct for lawyers subjects prosecutors to ethical responsibilities beyond those imposed on other lawyers. See Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.8 (providing eight “special responsibilities of a prosecutor” in addition to the disciplinary rules governing all attorneys). Violations of these responsibilities can result in discipline ranging from a public reprimand to suspension or revocation of the prosecutor’s law license. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 205, 207–08 (Iowa 2007) (public reprimand); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 177–78 (Iowa 2005) (suspension of law license).

Neither rule 1.413 nor § 619.19 applies to Christensen’s conduct as a prosecutor in this case. As a result, we hold that the district court erred by relying on this rule and statute to impose a monetary sanction against Christensen for his conduct. We thus reverse the sanctions order and the monetary sanction it imposed.

(Mike Frisch)