Broken Spirit
The Louisiana Supreme Court imposed a fully deferred 60-day suspension in light of the attorney’s mental health issues
In 2022, the ODC received a complaint from Sarah Watson, the Legal Director for the Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center, Inc. (“LFHAC”). Respondent, who had no experience in defending claims brought under the Fair Housing Act, represented Kevin Belton in a federal civil suit for alleged housing discrimination initiated by the LFHAC against Mr. Belton on behalf of plaintiffs Deborah Olsen and Clifford Osborne, III. The complaint advised of the following:
In May 2020, respondent filed a waiver of service for summons. Therein, he acknowledged that an answer was due within sixty days. Respondent requested and was granted an extension of time to file Mr. Belton’s answer, but he failed to do so. Plaintiffs then moved for entry of default against Mr. Belton. The clerk of court issued a notice of entry of default, but over the next year, respondent took no action in the litigation. In June 2021, plaintiffs moved for entry of default judgment. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to set aside entry of default, representing, in pertinent part, as follows:
[U]ndersigned counsel was diagnosed with “Institutional Betrayal Trauma” manifesting symptoms of high anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other symptoms which prohibited and made difficult his ability to practice law at a level normal attorneys are able to do. These symptoms began manifesting in late 2019 and were treated beginning in June 2020. These symptoms severely inhibited the undersigned’s ability to practice law through December of 2020.
The district court granted the motion to set aside, and respondent then filed an answer on behalf of Mr. Belton. The court issued a scheduling order which set a discovery completion deadline for May 23, 2022, with written discovery required to be served more than thirty days before that deadline.
Further lapses led to summary judgment against the client.
In response to the bar complaint, Respondent advised that he had relocated to Bend, Oregon
During his sworn statement, respondent testified that he “had diminished capacity,” “was a disabled attorney that wasn’t capable of providing answers to anyone,” and was “not in a place to handle” the representation of Mr. Belton.
Background
Respondent testified that he graduated from Mississippi College of Law, and later served as an adjunct professor at Grambling State University. After clerking for the Mississippi Supreme Court, he worked for the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office and the United States Attorney’s Office. Thereafter, respondent began working on political campaigns and then in criminal defense. However, he would soon become discouraged with the criminal justice system and lost confidence in his ability to help his clients. He testified: “After four years of defending someone without pay. And in that moment, my mind broke. My spirit broke. … and my confidence was completely gone.” As his problems began to interfere with his ability to practice law, respondent voluntarily contacted the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program (“JLAP”) for assistance…
Compelling mitigation
Clearly, the hearing committee was impressed by the mitigating factors present in this case, most notably respondent’s significant personal and emotional problems. We agree that the mitigating factors justify a fully deferred suspension.
Sanction
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee, and considering the record and briefs filed by the parties, it is ordered that Paul H. Hattaway, Louisiana Bar Roll number 36870, be and he hereby is suspended from the practice of law for sixty days. This suspension shall be deferred in its entirety, with the condition that any misconduct during the deferral period may be grounds for making the deferred suspension executory or imposing additional discipline, as appropriate. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.