Magistrate Removed From Office

The Iowa Supreme Court has removed a magistrate from office rather than impose a recommended 90-day suspension

Over twenty years ago, we said that “[t]he strength of our judicial system is due in large part to its independence and neutrality. These twin qualities help remove outside influences from judicial decision-making, and promote public respect and confidence in our system of justice.” In re Inquiry Concerning Patrick McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted). Some today might question that underlying premise—that there is in fact public respect and confidence in the judiciary. In an age where judges are under seemingly endless scrutiny and attack, it is ever more critical that judges ensure that their words and actions are above reproach.

This is a judicial disciplinary action against Judicial Magistrate David J. Hanson (Magistrate Hanson) for the First Judicial District of Iowa related to statements he made in two separate cases that purport to demonstrate bias, prejudice, and a lack of impartiality. In one case, Magistrate Hanson denied an arrest warrant in a lengthy written order that reflected his own disparaging views about young male victims of sexual assault. In the other, Magistrate Hanson made statements in open court using a derogatory racial slur and reflecting stereotypes about a criminal defendant. The Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Commission) filed an application for imposition of discipline against Magistrate Hanson. The Commission found that Magistrate Hanson violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that he be suspended for ninety days without pay and ordered to participate in mandatory anger management and bias training.

Even more concerning than the clearly inappropriate statements Magistrate Hanson made in his written order and from the bench is his response to the Commission’s application for disciplinary action. His complete lack of self awareness and contrition reflects an unwillingness (or inability) to change his behavior and further undermines public respect and confidence in the judiciary. Accordingly, we grant the Commission’s application. But we conclude that the appropriate discipline is to remove Magistrate Hanson from his position as a judicial officer.

The arrest warrant matter

Magistrate Hanson entered a six-page, single-spaced order denying the request for an arrest warrant on the basis that he did not find John Doe credible and therefore the warrant application lacked probable cause. In explaining the reasons for discrediting John Doe’s allegations, Magistrate Hanson: (1) described John Doe’s claim that he was unable to push away the female offender as “absurd” given a male’s “innate physical advantage,” noting that the female offender was identified as five feet eleven inches tall and weighed 290 pounds, which he suspected “most likely represents female obesity rather than muscular weight” such that John Doe’s will was not likely “overridden by force”; (2) explained that “[a]ny self-respecting young male” would have simply removed  himself from any sexual touching that was truly unwelcomed, describing Magistrate Hanson’s own response when he received an “unwelcome[d] sexual touch” as a teenager; (3) described John Doe’s actions as “contrary to nature” because the “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy’s reaction to being undressed by a teenage girl” is, “Alright! I’m gonna GET some!”; and (4) claimed as fact what “[c]ommon human experience suggests: if a man imbibes a truly substantial quantity of alcohol, to the point that he cannot rationally consent to engage in sex[ual] relations, that man’s physical ability to perform sexually also goes away until he sobers.” The order then went into graphic detail about the physiology of the male sex organ—which we choose not to repeat—explaining why “[c]ommon human experience” undermined John Doe’s story.

From this discussion, Magistrate Hanson declared that “John Doe knew exactly what Defendant was doing to him, welcomed the advance, and both freely consented and actively participated in the sex acts,” only to “later regret[] his free will choice.

The slur

Less than a year later, in July 2023, and while the first complaint was still pending, the Commission received another complaint against Magistrate Hanson. This complaint was also filed by the chief judge of the first judicial district based on an email she received from a law school student working as a prosecuting intern for the summer with the Fayette County Attorney’s office. The intern raised issues of bias, discrimination, and derogatory  remarks made by Magistrate Hanson in open court during a proceeding in which the intern was representing the state in prosecuting simple misdemeanor charges. As described by the intern:

During magistrate court on July 18, 2023, Judge Hanson was reviewing a case where the defendant was of Hispanic ethnicity. Judge Hanson noted that the charges were for no license and no insurance, and asked me, “Is this guy a wetback? An illegal?” He also asked if I was sure this was the defendant’s real name and commented that the defendant probably stole someone’s ID card or identity.

We choose to only repeat the above-quoted racially derogatory slur in full once throughout the opinion. Those remarks in open court made the intern feel “extremely uncomfortable” and “extremely concerned about [Magistrate] Hanson’s bias affecting defendants’ right to an impartial jurist.”

The written order’s inappropriate commentary

Magistrate Hanson also included inappropriate commentary in the written order about his views on how a “normal, hormone-ridden teenage boy” would react and the physiology of how a male’s sex organ works, and unfounded assumptions about the alleged female offender based on her height and weight. These demeaning and sophomoric justifications have no place in a judicial order. See In re Russo, 231 A.3d at 570 (“Especially when it comes to sensitive matters like domestic violence and sexual assault, that tone [set by the judge] must be dignified, solemn, and respectful, not demeaning or sophomoric.”). Magistrate Hanson fails to appreciate the effect his words have on the individuals before him seeking justice from our courts—here, the alleged victim of sexual abuse. See In re Jenkins, 503 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1993) (en banc) (“The authority exercised by a judge is so great as to easily break ordinary people who are rendered comparatively helpless in their relationship with a court. Such authority should not be entrusted to those who, either deliberately or through thoughtlessness, offend the ordinary sensibilities of citizens. . . . Nowhere is it more true than in the words chosen by a judge in a decision or decree that becomes a permanent public record.”).

Equally troubling is the fact that Magistrate Hanson admitted during the Commission hearing to “ruling in anger” when he denied the arrest warrant application a few days after it was filed. We recognize that judicial officers are imperfect; we do not expect infallibility. Judges, like the parties before them, deserve a measure of grace. But this was not a situation where a judicial officer lost his temper in the heat of a moment.

The court said what goes without saying

It should go without saying that the term “w******” is a racially derogatory, highly offensive slur that does not belong in a courtroom—and especially not from the mouth of a judge.

His view

Except we must say the obvious—that the term is derogatory—because Magistrate Hanson continues to defend his use of it. He does not dispute that he said the word in open court: “I assume I did, without thinking about it.” Rather than recognize the term as the racial epithet that it is, he labels it as “someone’s taboo” that he “[a]pparently . . . transgressed.” 

Sanction considerations

Not only did Magistrate Hanson not consider his conduct and statements inappropriate when they were made, but he defended them throughout the Commission’s investigation, even up to the time of oral argument before our court. He has not shown regret for his choice of words. He has not shown genuine remorse for the effect his statements likely had on the litigants. He has shown no aptitude for self-improvement. Indeed, he suggested in his brief that the Commission simply provide him with a list of “bad words” so that he can avoid them in conversation.

Most concerning, though, is Magistrate Hanson’s lack of self-awareness and his apparent inability for self-reflection as revealed in his responsive brief filed with our court.

Further

In his brief, Magistrate Hanson explained his view of sexual assault allegations:

All judges should know, and fear, false accusations of sexual crimes alleged long after the supposed events. I witnessed the televised atrocities visited upon U.S. Supreme [Court] Justice nominees . . . by women, whom effective cross examinations showed to be, telling falsehoods. I will never abet such “high tech lynchings.”

Magistrate Hanson’s statements in 2022 and 2023 and this year before our court are not those of an independent, impartial arbiter carefully considering whether the allegations provided in the affidavit before him supplied probable cause to support an arrest warrant. Instead, they reflect the biases of someone with preconceived and inflexible notions about alleged sexual assault victims.

No lesser sanction than removal

Upon careful consideration, we conclude that Magistrate Hanson “is simply and unalterably unsuited to be a judge, and no attempts at behavior modification are going to change that significantly. [H]e simply should not be a judge.”

(Mike Frisch)