Familiarity Does Not Breed Recusal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a recusal motion in a matter involving life insurance provision in a permanent parenting plan

In essence, Petitioner argues that because Chancellor Bryant is familiar with certain parties and attorneys in this matter, there is an unacceptable appearance of bias. However, Petitioner’s argument lacks specificity as to the nature and depth of Chancellor Bryant’s relationship with the parties and attorneys at issue, or what if any personal knowledge Chancellor Bryant has regarding the underlying facts in dispute. For example, Petitioner’s statement in her petition that “it is apparent that the Chancellor has some kind of previous relationship with the deceased and Ms. Blackwell” is very attenuated. Petitioner correctly cites Rule 2.11 of the Tennessee Code of Judicial Conduct for the proposition that a judge is required to recuse when her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Petitioner places special emphasis on the word “might.” Nevertheless, the word “might” is followed by the word “reasonably,” which is no less important. While some relationships may give rise to the appearance of bias depending on the significance of the relationship, Tennessee law does not require a judge’s recusal simply because the judge knows a party or an attorney in a case before her. A judge’s mere familiarity with a party or attorney does not alone equate to the judge being predisposed to rule for or against that party or attorney.

(Mike Frisch)