Soured Relationship Leads To Proposed Suspension

An Illinois Hearing Board has recommended a 60-day suspension of an attorney for a number of rule violations.

Among the findings

We find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent began a sexual relationship with his client, R.C., after their attorney-client relationship commenced, which also constituted a conflict of interest. We find that Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.8(j).

The client owned a hair salon and sought relief from COVID related restrictions.

Respondent and R.C. were in a romantic relationship from May or June 2020 to February 2023. (Tr. 238-39, 310-11). However, they gave conflicting testimony about when their sexual relationship began and whether he was her attorney at that time. Respondent testified that the sexual relationship began on June 6, 2020, whereas R.C. testified that it began on June 15, 2020. (Tr. 43-44, 51-54, 182-83, 186-88, 231-34). Respondent testified that he believed his representation of R.C. ended with the issuance of the Governor’s executive order on May 29, 2020, which rendered his May 27, 2020, cease-and-desist notice “moot.” (Tr. 41-42, 303). R.C. testified that Respondent was handling other legal matters for her in June 2020, including the debt collection and order of protection matters, “[b]ecause he was my lawyer.” (Tr. 181-84).

However, in June 2021, during the Administrator’s initial investigation of Respondent’s conduct, R.C. reported that she was not Respondent’s client when their sexual relationship began. (Tr. 245, 248; Res. Ex. 2 at 4-6). In 2022, Respondent ran for Illinois Attorney General, which brought his personal life into the limelight. In June 2022, in response to an article criticizing their relationship, R.C. asserted on social media that their attorney-client relationship ended with Respondent’s writing of the government agency letters for her salon and that she “was NEVER a client having sexual relations with him.” (Tr. 236-38, 284-87; Res. Ex. 7 (emphasis in original)). In this hearing, R.C. admitted that the earlier statements were lies to protect her dating relationship and Respondent, and that she would lie to protect her interests. (Tr. 196-99, 238, 245-46, 248, 285-86)

Finding

we conclude that there was no gap in Respondent’s attorney-client relationship with R.C. from May 11, 2020, through June 2020. Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine whether Respondent and R.C. first had sexual relations on June 6 or June 15, 2020. Either way, the sexual relationship began after the attorney-client relationship commenced, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.8(j).

The relations also constituted a conflict of interest.

Mixing business

We find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that, by forming a business with client R.C. and obtaining loans with her to fund the company, without providing the required safeguards, Respondent entered into a prohibited business transaction with a client. We find that Respondent’s conduct violated Rule 1.8(a).

Not unfair

The Administrator did not dispute that the transaction terms were fair, reasonable, and fully disclosed in writing, as R.C. signed the written operating agreement and loan documents. However, there was no evidence that the other two Rule 1.8(a) protections occurred at any point in relation to the startup of the Company, so we find that they were not provided. We also find that forming and funding a business entity with another person clearly constitutes a business transaction. Thus, the only disputed element of this charge is whether R.C. was Respondent’s client during the formation and funding of the Company.

The hearing found that she was.

Further

We find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent brought a frivolous proceeding in violation of Rule 3.1, wrote a disparaging email in violation of Rule 4.4(a), sent two emails to a known represented party in violation of Rule 4.2, and caused the adjudication of a motion for sanctions against him, which prejudiced the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). However, we also find that some of the charged conduct did not violate Rules 3.1 and 4.4(a), nor did Respondent violate Rule 3.4(c).

These charges relate to R.C.’s bankruptcy and his conduct after the relationship had “soured”

Rule 4.4(a) prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct, while representing a client, that has no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, burden, or delay a third party. Ill. R. Prof’l Cond. R. 4.4(a). In Counts III and IV, the Administrator charged Respondent with violating this Rule by filing and pursuing the chancery and order of protection cases against R.C. and by making disparaging remarks about R.C. in his June 1, 2023, email to her and a creditor.

The chapeau defense did not wash

we are not persuaded by Respondent’s explanation that he took off his lawyer hat while writing this email. Respondent informed the recipients about the legal impact of R.C.’s newly filed bankruptcy on the creditor’s efforts to collect from the Company. He further gave the impression that he was acting as the Company’s lawyer by signing the email “Attorney at Law,” followed by his firm’s contact information. It is irrelevant that Respondent used the same account for personal emails, as there was no evidence that was known to the creditor, so it had no impact on their perception of Respondent’s role. For these reasons, we find that Respondent was acting on behalf of his client, the Company, in his June 1, 2023, email.

The second and final element of Rule 4.4(a) is that the conduct has no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, burden, or delay a third party. We find this element to be proven as to Respondent’s June 1, 2023, email but not as to the two court cases, with the “third party” at issue in each instance being R.C.

Communication with R.C.

we find that Respondent did not have consent from attorney Pioletti to email R.C. directly. Respondent’s unrebutted testimony was that Pioletti asked to be kept informed about all Company business issues, including those unrelated to R.C.’s bankruptcy, so Pioletti could try to help R.C. We find that Pioletti’s request for Respondent to inform him about collateral matters did not equate to permission for Respondent to contact Pioletti’s client about bankruptcy matters. There was no evidence that Respondent was otherwise authorized to contact R.C. directly.

Finally

Respondent’s misconduct, including filing the frivolous chancery case against R.C., disparaging R.C. in an email, and twice contacting R.C. directly about her bankruptcy when he knew she was represented in that matter, caused attorney Pioletti to spend time preparing and arguing the motion for sanctions. It also caused Judge Gorman to hear that motion and issue a 41-page opinion explaining her sanction order. “Even if the underlying case is not harmed, the administration of justice is prejudiced if an attorney’s misconduct causes additional work for judges or other attorneys, or causes additional proceedings to be held.” In re Ginzkey, 2021PR00031, M.R. 031643 (May 16, 2023) (Hearing Bd. at 9-10). We find that Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice because his misconduct caused extra work for another attorney and a judge, as well as created the need for an additional hearing.

For these reasons, we find that the Administrator proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d).

Sanction

We find no aggravating factors. Any potentially aggravating evidence came only from R.C.’s uncorroborated testimony. Based on her admitted willingness to act in furtherance of her own interests and our finding that she threatened to change her story to the ARDC to cause Respondent to lose his law license, we find no evidence of aggravation…

Respondent’s misconduct was more serious than that in the cases resulting in a reprimand, censure, or 30-day suspension, but it did not rise to the level of the misconduct and aggravation meriting much longer suspensions. Some of the Administrator’s charges were not proven, and all of the proven misconduct arose from one client relationship which evolved into a personal and business relationship that eventually soured. Nonetheless, this client was not financially harmed, nor were there any allegations of misconduct related to other clients during the three-year period
at issue. We emphasize that there were no aggravating factors, and the highly compelling mitigating factors convinced us that Respondent has learned his lesson, is unlikely to repeat his mistakes, and poses no risk to the public. Considering the relevant case law and the totality of these circumstances, we recommend that Respondent, Thomas Guy DeVore, be suspended for 60 days.

The Illinoize reported on the sanctions imposed in the bankruptcy matter

[Bankruptcy Court Judge Mary] Gorman’s opinion was unkind to DeVore, claiming his actions were “egregious violations” of the automatic stay law.

“Mr. DeVore’s conduct was indefensible. He filed a lawsuit just two days after the Debtor filed bankruptcy, and, despite being told by [Craig’s attorney] that the filing violated the stay, he doubled down with an emergency motion and then his petition for an order of protection,” Gorman wrote. “The filing of the petition for an order of protection was particularly offensive because Mr. DeVore attempted to use a statute designed to help vulnerable people, including children, from the horrors of domestic violence to settle his business disputes with the Debtor. He misrepresented that he was a victim of domestic violence when he was not, and he presented false and misleading evidence in his petition and the attached narrative. “

Gorman ordered DeVore to pay Craig around $14,000 in damages, which was less than the $20,000 she asked for.

She called his actions “willful and egregious,” and that his conduct was “highly unprofessional.”

The article has a link to the opinion. (Mike Frisch)