Anti-SLAPP Protections May Apply In Litigation Between Law Firm And Former Associate
The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed and remanded the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a breach of contract action brought against a law firm by a former associate
In these related appeals, the defendants, Timothy Brignole and the law firm of Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC (law firm), appeal from the judgments of the trial court denying their special motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Connecticut’s anti-SLAPP statute, General Statutes § 52-196a, in this breach of contract action brought by the self-represented plaintiff, J. Xavier Pryor.
Facts
At all relevant times, Brignole was the owner, manager, and principal of the law firm, which previously employed the plaintiff as an associate attorney. In 2015, the law firm brought a civil action against the plaintiff and another entity. In March, 2018, the plaintiff and the law firm resolved that action by executing a settlement agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff paid the law firm $45,000 in exchange for a general release of all causes of action. The settlement agreement also included a non-disparagement clause, under which the defendants agreed ‘‘to not disparage or criticize [the plaintiff] and to not do or say anything that could harm the [plaintiff’s] interests or reputation . . . .’’
On June 10, 2018, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21, a fact memorialized on the Judicial Branch website. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, on or about June 20, 2018, Brignole sent or caused to be sent to ‘‘various news outlets and persons’’ an anonymous letter bearing the headline ‘‘Attorney Beats Wife In Front of Child,’’ which set forth the factual basis for the charges against the plaintiff, identified the plaintiff by his name, date of birth, and office address, and opined that his conduct was a matter of ‘‘public concern’’ because it implicated his fitness to practice law and that the judicial system was likely to cover up the matter due to his status as an attorney.
Denial
we join those jurisdictions that have held that the merits of a complaint—and the moving party’s corresponding admission or denial of the allegations therein—have no bearing on the threshold inquiry under § 52-196a (e) (3) as to whether the moving party has made ‘‘an initial showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the opposing party’s complaint, counterclaim or cross claim is based on the moving party’s exercise of its right of free speech, right to petition the government, or right of association under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state in connection with a matter of public concern . . . .’’
…we conclude that the trial court improperly construed the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to require a moving party to admit to engaging in the conduct alleged in the operative complaint. It, therefore, improperly denied the special motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on that basis.
Matter of public concern
As our Supreme Court has observed, ‘‘[i]t is well established that [t]he commission of crime [and] prosecutions resulting from it . . . are without question events of legitimate concern to the public . . . . Indeed, [p]ublic allegations that someone is involved in crime generally are speech on a matter of public concern.’’ …Bound by that authority we conclude that the conduct alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint involved a matter of public concern for purposes of § 52 196a (e) (3).
Conclusion
In accordance with the remand we are ordering in this case, we direct the trial court to address the additional arguments that the defendants made in support of their special motions to dismiss and the additional grounds raised in opposition by the plaintiff.
The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.