Judge Removed From Office
The New Jersey Supreme Court has removed a municipal court judge from office
This matter involves serious acts of misconduct by a Judge of the Municipal Court, Respondent R. Douglas Hoffman. In light of Respondent’s “nonconsensual, inappropriate, and sexually suggestive touching of [an] employee,” the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct (ACJC) found that Respondent violated three canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended that he be removed from office. Respondent acknowledges that he violated the canons charged in this matter but does not admit to touching the employee “in a sexually suggestive manner.” He argues that “the recommended quantum of discipline” — removal — “is excessive and inconsistent with long-established precedent.”
HELD: The Court’s review of the record reveals that Respondent invited a subordinate court employee to his summer home, provided beer and shots of hard liquor that the two drank liberally over the course of several hours, discussed intimate details of the employee’s sexual relationship with her boyfriend, and then touched her in a sexually suggestive manner without her consent. Because of the blatant and serious nature of Respondent’s misconduct, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal.
Facts
Our review of the record reveals that Respondent invited a subordinate court employee to his summer home, provided beer and shots of hard liquor that the two drank liberally over the course of several hours, discussed intimate details of the employee’s sexual relationship with her boyfriend, and then touched her in a sexually suggestive manner without her consent. Because of the blatant and serious nature of Respondent’s misconduct, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that there is cause for removal. We therefore order his removal from office.
Respondent was admitted to practice law in 1972. Since 2010, he has served as a part-time Judge of the Municipal Court in Robbinsville. Since 2022, he has also served as a part-time judge in two shared municipal courts: New Hanover and Wrightstown; and Mansfield, Springfield, and Southampton.
Starting in April 2021, A.A. worked as a clerk in the Robbinsville Municipal Court. She was 27 years old at the time of the incident described below. Respondent, age 75 at that time, was her superior.
She had accepted an invitation to his beach house
When A.A. arrived, Respondent was on the front porch. The two talked there for about one hour. Respondent then gave A.A. a tour of the house, after which they spent about three hours mostly in the living room. During that time, Respondent provided alcohol that the two drank in the kitchen. Respondent had one can of beer and four shots of whiskey; A.A. drank at least two beers and four shots of whiskey.
Initially, Respondent and A.A. sat on separate couches in the living room. At one point, he took a photo of her on the couch with a beer. A.A. eventually sat next to Respondent on the same couch where they could both watch a baseball game on her cell phone. While on the couch, the ACJC found, Respondent touched A.A. “on her knee and inner thigh in a manner that may reasonably be construed as sexual in nature.”
Respondent presented his version of what took place in a recorded interview and at a hearing. Respondent does not dispute the above description of events except for one thing: he denies that he “touched [A.A.] in a sexually suggestive manner.”
Then
Respondent testified the second touching was “probably within a minute of the first.” He conceded he did not ask permission before touching A.A. either time. As he explained, “[t]hese [were] reassuring taps.” “Why do I need permission for that?” He also denied touching A.A. in a sexual manner: “[I]t wasn’t what I’m accused of allegedly touching” — “near her crotch.” When asked whether “[p]art of your hand was on the inside of her thigh,” Respondent stated, “Correct, probably mid-thigh, closer to the knee.” According to Respondent, A.A. “disappeared” “maybe three or four minutes later.”
She advised her superiors and proceedings followed before the Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct
Beyond “[d]rinking liberally with” A.A., the ACJC found that Respondent’s second ethical breach was “his unwanted and inappropriate touching of [A.A.] on her knee and inner thigh in a manner that may reasonably be construed as sexual in nature.” The Committee focused “not only on [A.A.’s] stated perception at the time,” but also on her response — leaving the house at once and reporting the incident to her immediate supervisor within hours. “Viewed in their totality,” the ACJC concluded, “these circumstances evince[d], clearly and convincingly, that Respondent’s touch was unwelcomed and understood by [A.A.] to be of a very personal and sexually suggestive nature to which she took offense.”
The Committee rejected Respondent’s attempt to discredit A.A.’s testimony because of “her level of intoxication” and “purportedly varying accounts” of how much alcohol she drank. The ACJC reasoned that A.A.’s “self-awareness of the number of drinks” she consumed that afternoon “bears 10 no reasonable relationship to her recall of a traumatic event involving her superior’s unwanted, offensive, and sexually suggestive touch.”
The ACJC also observed that “Respondent’s demeanor when testifying before the Committee . . . was flippant and betrayed a palpable disrespect for the judicial disciplinary process.” The Committee similarly commented that “his generally glib demeanor when testifying . . . reveal[ed] a lack of self-control, probity, and sound judgment unbefitting a judge.”
The ACJC weighed various aggravating and mitigating factors before it recommended that Respondent be removed from office. In addition to the aggravating factors recounted above, the Committee relied on A.A.’s “vulnerability as a subordinate employee” and the inherent inequity in their relationship.
Harm
A.A. also testified that she suffered lasting harm. She resigned from her position to avoid being around Respondent, took steps to avoid seeing him in public out of fear, and continued to have nightmares about the incident one year later.
The court accepted the recommendation for removal
Today, judges of the Superior Court receive mandatory training on the prevention of sexual harassment when they are appointed to the bench and refresher courses thereafter. They are also required to certify annually that they have reviewed and understand the Judiciary’s anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies. Municipal court judges receive similar training; they are subject to policies and training at the municipal level.
All judges know there is no place for sexual misconduct or harassment in the judicial system. Today we make clear that egregious violations of that rule will result in removal from office and not a period of suspension.
Like the ACJC, we find no compelling mitigating factors. We acknowledge Respondent’s lengthy service as a municipal court judge. We also note that counsel for the ACJC did not challenge Respondent’s statement that he has no prior disciplinary history. But Respondent disputes the most serious misconduct in this matter — sexually touching a subordinate without her consent. He has not expressed remorse or contrition. And his demeanor at the hearing, as the ACJC noted, was flippant, defiant, and disrespectful of the disciplinary process.
In short, Respondent’s conduct was “unbecoming and inappropriate for one holding the position of a judge.” See Seaman, 133 N.J. at 99.
(Mike Frisch)