Florida Resignation Leads To South Carolina Disbarment

The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected an opposition to reciprocal discipline based on a Florida sanction and disbarred an attorney

In his response to the notice of discipline, Respondent argues in a conclusory fashion that the allegations in the Florida disciplinary proceedings were unfounded and that he was “strong-armed” into resigning his membership Florida Bar. Specifically, Respondent claims that there was essentially no viable alternative when faced with the threat of “unduly burdensome” disciplinary proceedings, as there is no option to resign from the Florida Bar if a lawyer has grievances pending against him at the time he wishes to resign. Respondent argues he was forced to make this choice at a particularly vulnerable time when he was suffering multiple serious, undisclosed health conditions and faced multiple surgeries. He also  (incorrectly) claims he has already “retired” from the practice of law in South Carolina and, thus, reciprocal discipline would be merely punitive.

Because Respondent presented no evidence that he was not afforded the requisite due process in Florida, we find Respondent failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that imposition of identical discipline in South Carolina is inappropriate. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1917) (establishing that reciprocal attorney discipline is constitutional, so long as the original disciplinary proceedings afforded the lawyer due process and setting forth due process criteria that are mirrored in Rule 29, RLDE); First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (establishing that assertions made without legal argument or supporting authority are insufficient to demonstrate error and will not be considered).

The court noted that Respondent’s revocation was “tantamount” to disbarment under Florida rules. (Mike Frisch)