Emails And Reinstatement

Reinstatement has been denied to a suspended Colorado attorney in a decision by a Hearing Board

In 2021, Matthew J. Greife (“Petitioner”) was suspended for three years for neglecting two separate bankruptcy matters, failing to keep his clients reasonably informed, charging nonrefundable fees, failing to maintain required financial records, and recklessly converting client funds. In this reinstatement proceeding, Petitioner has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is rehabilitated from his misconduct or that he is fit to practice law. He is thus not entitled to be reinstated to the practice of law in Colorado at this time, and he may not petition for reinstatement for another two years.

Petitioner

Petitioner was born in Wisconsin and spent his childhood in the Minneapolis metropolitan area. He fell in love with Colorado on a west-bound road trip; it became his “mission” to move to the state. He enrolled as an undergraduate at Colorado State University (“CSU”) and pursued a double major in sociology and political science. He then attended Whittier Law School in Southern California, obtaining his law degree in 2010 and passing the California bar examination. But he decided against staying in California, instead choosing to return to Colorado. He also opted not to jump into legal practice, as he was always more interested in the empirical side of law. So he accepted admission into the University of Colorado Denver master’s program in sociology, gravitating toward studies in environmental justice. While taking classes in the masters’ program, he passed the Colorado bar examination.

After completing his master’s degree in Denver, Petitioner pursued a second master’s degree and a sociology doctorate at the University of Georgia. He focused his research on crime, law, deviance, and punishment. He learned that he liked being in the classroom and working with students, and he resolved to pursue a career in academia. But the academic job market offered “slim pickings,” and he had difficulty finding a position. So he returned to Colorado in 2016 to complete his dissertation and to gain his professional footing. To supplement his income, he took on a few small cases for clients while beginning his academic career in late 2016 as an adjunct professor in CSU’s sociology department. Using his background in sociology and data analysis, he pioneered new arguments to successfully challenge the scientific validity of standardized field sobriety tests in driving under the influence (“DUI”) cases.

Concerns about reinstatement involve in part a series of emails to counsel that are set out at length in the opinion

Finally, we cannot clearly or convincing conclude that Petitioner is able to use good judgment on behalf of clients and in conducting professional business. Petitioner’s testimony leads us to believe that he has tended to see legal cases, including his disciplinary case, through an ideological lens in which the law is wielded as a tool of systemic governmental oppression. Often, that viewpoint redounded to his clients’ benefit, particularly when he channeled his energies into challenging the government’s case with data, analysis, and sound legal argument.

As Petitioner’s own witnesses attested, however, he grew blinded by his habitual cynicism and distrust, occasionally acting in a manner that did not advance the interests he represented. For instance, Petitioner recounted feeling so disgusted by the government’s decisions in the Douglas County rape/DUI case that he walked out of his client’s sentencing hearing. Absenting himself from that important procedural event, no matter how painful, displayed a lack of good judgment and represented a failing as his client’s advocate. 

But the most salient examples, of course, are Petitioner’s emails to Kristofco. He sent those emails in his reinstatement matter, which was imbued for Petitioner with residual anger from his disciplinary case. In that context, he inexplicably forwarded to Kristofco a communication with S.M., a former client, discussing information related to his representation of S.M. Worse still, that email threatened S.M.’s safety or welfare. At the reinstatement hearing, Petitioner endorsed drafting and forwarding the email as appropriate in the circumstance. This behavior, too, we find lacking in good judgment when conducting professional business.

From a purely transactional point of view, Petitioner’s ad hominem attacks of Kristofco speak most loudly about whether he is able to exercise good judgment in a professional setting. In a circumstance in which Petitioner was acting to restore his professional standing, he was so overcome by his visceral reaction to Kristofco that he was unable to restrain himself at a time when doing so might have materially influenced whether the People chose to contest his reinstatement. Moreover, this was not an isolated communique dashed off in the heat of the moment; Petitioner sent Kristofco several emails over the course of a working week. We are deeply uneasy that his conduct here could be a harbinger of things to come: if he lobbed these insults when his professional license is on the line, might he react similarly if a client’s life or liberty hangs in the balance? We have no clear proof that he will not. And we cannot simply trust Petitioner’s protestation that he indulges his personal animosities only when it comes to Kristofco. His request that we give him the benefit of the doubt on this score ignores the content of his email to S.M., flips the burden of proof on its head, and is antithetical to our mandate to ensure the protection of the public.

(Mike Frisch)