Recusal Denial Affirmed: Generic Associations No Basis To Infer Bias
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to recuse a trial judge
The Myers raise multiple allegations against Judge Coward. These allegations include:
• Judge Coward and opposing counsel, Sanford Steelman, went to the same undergraduate and graduate schools, and both were members of Phi Alpha Delta (though the Myers do not suggest they were members at the same time).
• Judge Coward’s professional relationships with the retired Superior Court Judge James Downs and the retired appellate court judge, Sanford Steelman, who both have acted as opposing counsel in the various cases before Judge Coward.
• Judge Coward and his staff refer to Steelman as “judge” due to Steelman’s retired appellate judge status, despite multiple objections by the Myers.
• Judge Coward has entered multiple rulings against the Myers’ counsel, Shira Hedgepeth, and multiple rulings related to the SMCC that negatively affect the Myers.
• The Myers believe Judge Coward has an interest in maintaining the outcome of the previous rulings he made that are now challenged in the Myer’s lawsuits.
• Attorney Shira Hedgepeth perceives Judge Coward “allows the constant belittling” of her by Steelman.
• Judge Coward signed Steelman’s proposed order after the hearing on the motion to quash subpoenas duces tecum despite attorney Shira Hedgepeth’s multiple objections and Judge Coward’s request at the hearing to include a statement of consent by both parties.
• Judge Coward denied the motion to recuse without referring the motion to another judge for review.
Looking to this Court’s previous explanations of what substantial evidence of “bias, prejudice, or interest” is, we determine the Myers have not carried their burden of objectively demonstrating that grounds exist for disqualification of Judge Coward. There must be “such a personal bias, prejudice or interest on the part of the judge that he would be unable to rule impartially.” State v. Kennedy, 110 N.C. App. 302, 305 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “bias, prejudice or interest which requires a trial judge to be recused from a trial has reference to the personal disposition or mental attitude of the trial judge, either favorable or unfavorable, toward a party to the action before him.” Id. (cleaned up). Another way to consider whether bias or prejudice exists, is by considering whether “a reasonable person would question whether the judge could rule impartially.”
In the present cases, the Myers’ contentions are based in large part upon generic factual allegations that would be common to many lawyers and judges in North Carolina: attending the same undergraduate and law schools, being members of a particular legal organization, and representing parties in other cases before a particular judge. The Myers have not demonstrated how these types of professional relationships have created any sort of improper bias or prejudice in this case. The remaining allegations are based upon rulings by Judge Coward that were opposed to the Myers’ position. These claims of bias are based at best upon “inferred perception[s]” and frustrations toward Judge Coward’s multiple rulings against them. Lange, 357 N.C. at 649.
There is no evidence of Judge Coward’s disposition toward either party, or evidence in the record of Judge Coward ever calling Steelman “judge.” In fact, all that is in the record is the Myers’ attorney calling Steelman “your Honor,” “Honorable Retired Judge Steelman,” “Retired Judge Steelman,” and “your Retired Honor.” Judge Coward repeatedly referred to Sanford Steelman as Mr. Steelman. Within the record, we only find one reference of his judicial assistant referring to Sanford Steelman as a Judge; but this was in an email, not open court, and was later followed by another email in which the assistant apologized for the judicial reference.
Further, Judge Coward was not required to refer the motion to recuse to another judge unless the allegations are such that findings of fact are necessary to consider the judge’s disqualification. See N.C. Nat. Bank v. Gillespie, 291 N.C. 303, 311 (1976) (“[W]hen the trial judge found sufficient force in the allegations contained in defendant’s motion to proceed to find facts, he should have either disqualified himself or referred the matter to another judge . . . .”).
Accordingly, there is no substantial evidence of bias, prejudice, or interest such that a reasonable person would be concerned Judge Coward could not rule impartially. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion for recusal.
(Mike Frisch)