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Law Clerk Confidentiality Breach Results In Disbarment

The Louisiana Supreme Court has disbarred (but not permanently) an attorney for misconduct as a judicial clerk

From February 1, 2018 to August 16, 2018, respondent was employed by the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”) as a law clerk for Judge Henry N. Brown, Jr. During that period, the Succession of Fred Langford Houston case was pending before the Second Circuit both on an application for supervisory writs and on appeal. Respondent was aware that Judge Brown was recused in Succession of Houston due to his relationship with Ms. Hanh Williams, one of the litigants in the case. In addition, respondent herself was a long time, close friend of Ms. Williams as well as Ms. Williams’ former attorney.

While employed as Judge Brown’s law clerk, respondent collected confidential court documents pertaining to the Succession of Houston case and emailed this information to her personal email address, to Ms. Williams, and to others. These documents included the pre-argument memorandum, the opinion distribution sheet, and the civil issue sheet. Respondent also saved confidential court documents to a personal flash drive, which was never recovered. Respondent conducted legal research and drafted pleadings, memoranda, and correspondence that were intended to be filed on behalf of Ms. Williams with the Second Circuit under the signature of another attorney. Respondent used court resources to perform this work, including a court-provided computer, copy machine, and Westlaw subscription.

In October 2020, a bill of information was filed in Caddo Parish charging respondent with three counts of malfeasance in office, in violation of La. R.S. 14:134A(2), and one count of offenses against intellectual property, in violation of La. R.S. 14:73.2A(2). In October 2022, respondent pleaded nolo contendere to a single misdemeanor violation of La. R.S. 14:73.2A(2).

Sanction

Respondent intentionally violated duties owed to the public, the legal system, and the legal profession, causing actual harm. It is obvious respondent intended to give Ms. Williams an advantage in the Succession of Houston litigation. Moreover, respondent’s actions caused significant disruption in the litigation, resulting in the transfer of the case to another circuit. The applicable baseline sanction is disbarment. In mitigation, we find respondent has no prior disciplinary record. We find the following aggravating factors are supported by the record: a dishonest or selfish motive, substantial experience in the practice of law, and illegal conduct. These factors indicate there is no ground to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment. However, we do not find sufficient evidence in the record to show that respondent has a fundamental lack of moral character and fitness which would warrant her permanent exclusion from the profession.

Therefore, we find the board’s recommendation of permanent disbarment is not appropriate, and we will instead impose ordinary disbarment. In doing so, we caution respondent that we will scrutinize any application for readmission with a careful eye to determine if she has taken genuine steps to reform her conduct.

WEIMER, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part

While in no way minimizing the egregious mistakes made by the respondent while employed by the court of appeal, I would point out that Ms. Chu is not defined solely by those mistakes, but also by a life time of achievement and a sincere commitment to helping others. She has provided legal services on a pro bono basis and on a low fee basis to those less fortunate and has also worked as an interpreter. Those who spoke on her behalf, and whose testimony the Hearing Committee found credible, recounted her “big heart,” citing her work with indigent clients and immigrants, her honesty, and her compassion.

Respondent faced the dilemma often encountered by those in disciplinary proceedings: how to apologize and accept responsibility for her conduct and at the same time offer an explanation for the events that unfolded in the hope of receiving leniency in the sanction. As the evidence adduced before the Hearing Committee reveals, after a 14 month long investigation into the criminal complaint lodged against respondent, the investigation was administratively closed in June 2019, only to be reopened after respondent filed to run for judge. As the Hearing Committee acknowledged, “had Respondent not filed to run for Judge after her termination, the criminal matter would have likely faded away quietly. But for the further investigation of the criminal matter, some of the presented evidence may not have developed in the disciplinary matter as it did.” While the Committee noted there was a political component to respondent’s prosecution, it did not consider this a mitigating factor. But it is a fact that supplies context to this matter.

Ultimately, the Hearing Committee recommended that respondent be disbarred. A majority of the Disciplinary Board recommended that she be permanently disbarred, with two board members dissenting and recommending ordinary disbarment. Following review of the record, the majority in this court has determined that respondent did not violate any of the charged provisions of Rule 3.5 (a determination with which I agree), but it appears that the recommendations of ordinary disbarment by the Hearing Committee and permanent disbarment by the Disciplinary Board were at least partially influenced by the erroneous findings of a Rule 3.5 violation. Yet, the majority here still imposes ordinary disbarment.

Respondent has been on interim suspension since October 7, 2020, or for more than four years. Based on the facts and circumstances of this case, I believe that is a sufficient sanction. This sanction would still require her to reapply for her license to practice law and if re-admitted, she could return to aiding the less fortunate as she had done before. I would not impose the sanction of disbarment, and respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to do so.

Justices Hughes and Griffin joined Chief Justice Weimer. (Mike Frisch)