The Aggregate Of Experiences

The New Jersey Appellate Division has held that a compensation judge is not per se disqualified because of actions undertaken as a legislator

These compensation cases, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes of this opinion, present a novel issue: whether a judge of compensation was required to recuse herself from presiding over a matter involving the application of a statute for which the judge was a sponsor in her prior capacity as a member of the Legislature.

Holding

A compensation judge who formerly sponsored a bill enacted into law is not per se disqualified from presiding over cases implicating or interpreting that law. “A judge ordinarily is not disqualifiable because of his [or her] own life experiences.” Johnson v. Salem Corp., 189 N.J. Super. 50, 60 (App. Div. 1983). “[E]ach of us is a product of the aggregate of our experiences, and our understanding is enhanced by the totality of our experiences.” Id. at 60-61. Thus, a judge’s personal knowledge of or experience with certain legislative history does not necessarily render the judge biased or unable to make a fair judgment in the matter.

Rather, the judge must determine whether a reasonable person would doubt the judge’s impartiality, given the judge’s prior involvement in the legislative proceedings and the issues and facts presented in the case before the judge. We are satisfied that Judge Downey did not abuse her discretion in deciding a recusal was unwarranted in this case. Her knowledge of the law and lawmaking was not extrajudicial knowledge but rather judicial knowledge that many judges take with them to the bench. In addition, her comments during conferences were based on her application of the statute, as it was enacted, to the facts presented to her at that time.

Respondent also argues that the judge, as a former sponsor of the bill, could be called as a witness and therefore should not have decided the matter. We are unpersuaded by this speculative contention. While a court may look to legislative history, including the sponsors’ statements, to shed light on an ambiguous statute, individual legislators are typically not subject to examination as to how they personally interpreted the statute. That is because we are not interested in the statement of one legislator as to what he or she believed was the correct interpretation of a statute.

(Mike Frisch)