A Family Emergency

A voluntary two-year suspension has been accepted by the Georgia Supreme Court

In late 2018 or early 2019, Hood agreed to represent a client against whom a default judgment, totaling $5,710, had been entered in DeKalb County Magistrate Court in favor of the client’s former tenant, who was attempting to recover her security deposit. Prior to retaining Hood, the landlord client had submitted a letter to the court, which the court treated as a motion to set aside the default judgment and set a hearing on the motion for February 28, 2019. Although Hood was aware on February 28, 2019, that his law license had been suspended for failure to respond to the State Bar’s notice of investigation in an unrelated matter, he appeared with the client at the courthouse on that day. When asked by the tenant’s counsel outside of the courtroom whether he represented the landlord, he responded vaguely and did not tell opposing counsel of his suspension. Instead, he abruptly left the courthouse after falsely advising the tenant’s counsel and a courtroom deputy that he had a family emergency. On March 4, 2019, this Court lifted the suspension and reinstated Hood to the practice of law. Two days later, Hood filed an entry of an appearance and filed an answer and counterclaim, even though default judgment had already been entered against his client.

On his attempt to appeal

Hood sought to appeal that order to superior court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari. However, the superior court dismissed the petition and imposed an award of attorney fees against Hood for $5,351.60, based on Hood’s “substantially frivolous” filing. Hood’s effort to challenge that order by filing a motion for new trial was also unsuccessful and resulted in the imposition of additional fees against Hood.

In an unrelated civi matter, summary judgment was entered when he failed to appear.

In his petition for voluntary discipline, Hood admitted that his response to the grievance was contrary to the record in the civil action, which showed that the summary judgment hearing was the only hearing scheduled during the time that Hood represented the client. Hood also admitted that he failed to timely respond to the notice of investigation issued by the Bar with respect to this matter.

The court deemed a one-year suspension sought by Respondent to be an insufficient sanction.

Nevertheless, because Hood is willing to accept a suspension of up to two years, we accept his petition for voluntary discipline, and we suspend Hood’s license to practice law for a period of two years.

(Mike Frisch)