A Second Look

In a matter in which the Georgia Supreme Court had rejected a proposed 30-day suspension and remanded for further fact-finding, the court has now ordered disbarment

The Special Master has now conducted that additional factfinding. After an evidentiary hearing on November 9, 2023, the Special Master issued his report and recommendation, recommending that Tuggle be disbarred. The Review Board later agreed with the Special Master recommendation. For the reasons explained below, so do we.

Respondent had neglected a matter leading to a default judgment against the client in a civil suit related to a probate matter entrusted to him

Ultimately, the client was successful in getting the judgment set aside based on the trial court’s finding that the default had resulted from Tuggle’s “abandonment” of his client. . . . The client spent $31,857 in attorney fees to get the judgment set aside.

A separate matter involved an elderly client who retained him to obtain Medicaid benefits for his spouse on a time-sensitive basis

The client ultimately hired new counsel and filed suit against Tuggle. Tuggle failed to answer, and a default judgment was entered in the amount of $22,176, plus $2,000 in attorney fees and costs. As of the disciplinary hearing, Tuggle had not paid the judgment.
                                                                                         . . .

[I]t was undisputed that Tuggle had entered an agreement with his clients’ “successor counsel” under which he agreed to “make payment” if they dismissed their barcomplaint against him.

Reasons for remand

Given the nature of Tuggle’s conduct and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, we held that the recommendation of a one-month suspension was “grossly inadequate.” Id. We stated that, instead, “a significant disciplinary sanction in the form of either a lengthy suspension with conditions or disbarment is warranted.” Id. at 279 (6) (c).

The court sought further information on the malpractice cases

Tuggle had unsuccessfully filed for bankruptcy twice during the pendency of his malpractice proceedings. Tuggle later characterized his statements about bankruptcy as a “threat,” a “tactic,” or “leverage” to jumpstart negotiations and get a reasonable settlement. But the Special Master found that Tuggle’s responses showed he had no intent to participate in the damages hearing or resolve the malpractice case.

Respondent did not for the damages hearing or take actions to pay the judgment; he made a few payments to the second client.

Before the Special Master

Tuggle claimed that he failed to fully satisfy the money judgments against him in part because he lacked the financial resources to do so. He argued that the Special Master, by disregarding his financial circumstances, had created a two tiered system of discipline in which wealthy lawyers receive lesser discipline than other lawyers who commit identical infractions but are unable to pay. The State Bar responded that Tuggle’s argument was a mere distraction from his misconduct. Tuggle had made no attempt at restitution even when he continued to earn income as a lawyer during the 16-month period between the April 2022 disciplinary hearing and the issuance of Tuggle II. Only when this Court signaled that Tuggle might be disbarred did he take any steps toward restitution, and even then, his offers of restitution to both clients were contingent on his retaining an active license to practice law—a contingency that was unlikely to occur. The State Bar argued that Tuggle’s claimed lack of financial resources was not a mitigating factor under these circumstances.

The court

At bottom, the Rules and our precedent support disbarment for misconduct like Tuggle’s.

(mike Frisch)