When It’s Over It’s Over

The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed a decision finding no liability by state actors in connection with an arrest and prosecution for juror intimidation

This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In this instance, we are asked to determine whether the State may be subject to civil liability for an arrest under circumstances in which, after interviewing a victim, a deputy obtained legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office that there was probable cause to believe that an individual had committed a statutory criminal offense, a judicial officer found probable cause to issue a warrant, and thereafter a trial judge acquitted the individual of the charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute in question.

The issues presented in this case arise in the context of Petitioner, Valerie Rovin’s, arrest and prosecution for violating the juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article (“CR”) § 9-305 (2021 Repl. Vol.). Ms. Rovin, upset by a jury’s verdict rendered against her daughter in a criminal trial, went to the jury foreperson’s workplace on the same day to confront him about the verdict. According to the foreperson, Ms. Rovin yelled at him, acted in an aggressive and threatening manner, and told him, among other things, that she was going to have an individual from Nicaragua “take care of him.” The foreperson immediately reported this exchange to the Sheriff’s Office. The deputy sheriff who investigated the matter consulted with prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office, who advised the deputy that Ms. Rovin’s conduct violated the juror intimidation statute.

Thereafter, the deputy applied for a statement of charges. A District Court Commissioner determined that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for Ms. Rovin’s arrest. At the close of the State’s case at Ms. Rovin’s bench trial, her counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not constitute juror intimidation under the statute because Ms. Rovin’s daughter’s criminal trial had concluded, and thus the foreperson was no longer serving on a jury and his service had concluded. The State disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s narrow interpretation of the statute and argued that the foreperson’s jury service was for the period of his summons, and that as a result of Ms. Rovin’s actions, the foreperson was dismissed from his jury service early. The circuit court determined that although Ms. Rovin’s actions were “very improper” and may have been evidence of juror “retaliation,” her actions did not fit within the conduct prohibited by the juror intimidation statute, and it therefore entered a judgment of acquittal.

Ms. Rovin then filed a civil suit against, among others, the State’s Attorney and Assistant State’s Attorney who advised the deputy and subsequently prosecuted her, and the deputy who applied for the charges and sought a warrant for her arrest. She asserted that the defendants, through their conduct in causing her arrest and prosecution, committed common law torts and violated her rights under various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. After the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and the matter was appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, this Court granted certiorari to determine, among other things, whether absolute immunity barred the claims.

Plaintiff’s contentions

At bottom, all of Ms. Rovin’s assertions flow from one premise, namely that the State’s Attorney’s Office’s legal interpretation of the juror intimidation statute—which is described above in the application for statement of charges submitted under oath by Deputy Cook and upon which Ms. Rovin was subsequently arrested and tried—was so obviously incorrect that “no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue.” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547.

We disagree. We determine that the State’s Attorney’s Office’s interpretation of the juror intimidation statute—which formed the basis of the statement of charges, and upon which Ms. Rovin was arrested—was an objectively reasonable, if not the correct, interpretation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we hold that the State’s Attorney’s Office’s interpretation of the juror intimidation statute—which formed the basis of the application for statement of charges upon which the District Court Commissioner made a probable cause determination, and for which Ms. Rovin was tried and ultimately acquitted—was objectively reasonable. Accordingly, Ms. Rovin cannot overcome the strong presumption of probable cause that attached to the warrant by establishing that “it [was] obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue,” Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 547.51

As such, in entering summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms. Rovin’s common law claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution, as well as her Article 26 and Article 24 claims arising from the same conduct, the circuit court correctly ruled that the State is not civilly liable for Ms. Rovin’s “arrest pursuant to a warrant based on a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest” even though a trial judge acquitted Ms. Rovin based upon that trial judge’s interpretation of the statute. Because probable cause and legal justification existed for Ms. Rovin’s arrest and imprisonment, these claims fail as a matter of law.

The court majority rejected other asserted bases for liability.

Justice Watts dissented

Respectfully, I dissent. This case involves the allegation by Ms. Rovin that she was arrested based on a mistake as to probable cause for her arrest. I would conclude that, on remand, the Circuit Court for Wicomico County erred in granting summary judgment in the State’s favor as to Ms. Rovin’s common law and constitutional claims on the ground that the holding of Supreme Court of the United States in United States in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) applied and therefore the officers responsible for her arrest had no civil liability. I would not decide the matter on a ground other than the one that the circuit court did and for which we remanded the case in State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 373-74, 246 A.3d 1190, 1222-23 (2021)

Delmarva now reported that plaintiff and juror had the same last name

Robert Rovin testified he was dismissed from jury service for the rest of the month because of what happened.

Melody Mitchell of Mitchell’s Martial Arts in Salisbury, where Robert Rovin works, said Valerie Rovin came into the business demanding to see Robert Rovin.

“She was very, very upset and very angry,” Mitchell said.

The general theme of Valerie Rovin’s comments were about how he could put another Rovin in jail, Robert Rovin testified Monday. He didn’t know her, but he realized he had met her once, he said.

He testified that he explained to her it wasn’t him that put her daughter in jail, it was her daughter that did, because of her actions. He said Valerie Rovin had threatened him with what he interpreted as a death threat, which had to do with someone named Bill Rovin getting Nicaraguans to “take care of” him.

(Mike Frisch)