One Star And “Offensive Personality”
An attorney’s response to a former client’s unfavorable google review drew a stayed 30-day suspension and probation with conditions from the Indiana Supreme Court.
The probation conditions include anger management therapy.
Respondent represented “Client” in a matter in St. Joseph County. The parties reached an agreement, and the case was dismissed after Client fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. Client later left a one-star review of Respondent’s law firm on Google in which Client complained of difficulties communicating with Respondent. Respondent then made multiple demands, using derogatory and profane language, that Client remove the review. When Client refused, Respondent posted a public response to the Google review in which he revealed damaging information about Client relating to the subject of the representation. Respondent revealed similar damaging information in a defamation lawsuit he filed against Client in Marion County. This lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice on Respondent’s motion in January 2024.
Violations
The parties agree that Respondent violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(c) by impermissibly revealing information relating to the representation and Admission and Discipline Rule 22 (Oath of Attorneys) by acting in an offensive manner.
Concurrence
Molter, J., concurring.
I concur with the Court’s approval of the parties’ Conditional Agreement. I write separately merely to note that, in my view, the parties’ agreement that Respondent violated Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(c) is independently sufficient to support their agreed discipline on these facts. Approving their Conditional Agreement is therefore warranted. But in a case where it makes a difference, I remain open to considering the question Justice Slaughter’s partial dissent identifies. That is, whether an attorney can be sanctioned for violating the oath that Admission and Discipline Rule 22 requires attorneys “take and subscribe to,” including its promise to “abstain from offensive personality.”
Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., join.
A partial concurrence and dissent from Justice Slaughter on the “offensive personality” violation
The commission charged—and Wruble agreed—that he violated the part of our oath requiring lawyers to “abstain from offensive personality”. I am generally content to sign off on settlement agreements between the commission and respondent lawyers, especially their agreements on what rules were violated. But today I part from my customary practice.
To be clear, my objection is not that this charge lacks factual support; Wruble’s personality during this episode was indeed offensive. I am concerned, rather, with interpreting our oath of attorneys to impose minimal standards that warrant sanctions for those whose conduct falls short. The oath is broad and aspirational, and it lacks the specific standards found in other rules—or in the myriad primary and secondary authorities refining those rules.
My specific concern is with the ever-present threat that lawyers will face charges for whatever the commission deems an “offensive personality”—an inherently subjective assessment that risks a dangerous slippery slope. The rules contemplate a wide range of permissible lawyer conduct that runs the gamut from amiable to aggressive, milquetoast to militant, passive to pugnacious. Unpopular lawyers or those with disfavored clients may be especially vulnerable to enforcement overreach. The better enforcement practice, in my view, is for the commission to avoid “offensive personality” charges altogether and to ground charges against those deserving of professional sanction (like Wruble) in one or more targeted professional-conduct rules.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s approval of the parties’ agreement concerning our oath of attorneys.
(Mike Frisch)