No Slack For Pro Se Attorney

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that the leniency due to a pro se litigant is not accorded to a pro se lawyer 

Does the pleading leniency we afford pro se litigants apply when the litigant is a licensed attorney? We conclude it does not. Trained lawyers are generally not unsophisticated litigants in need of special protections, and any leniency afforded is left to the discretion of the district court.

In this case, Jo Spence was fired after more than a decade working as an attorney at the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). She alleged the termination was in retaliation for filing internal discrimination complaints. But Spence failed to plead sufficient facts in her complaint to state all but one of her claims. Because of her legal training, the district court was not required to grant Spence the leniency afforded a typical pro se litigant, nor did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to do so. Spence’s surviving claim fails on summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

The court

We now hold that the liberal pleading standard for pro se litigants does not invariably apply when the litigant is a licensed attorney. In reaching this conclusion, we join the unanimous consensus of the other circuits that have addressed this question. As the Supreme Court has recognized, pro se pleadings are different from “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added). The requirement that courts construe pro se pleadings liberally does not ordinarily apply to pro se lawyers. Of course, district courts “must” construe complaints “so as to do justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e). In discharging that duty, courts retain discretion to consider supplemental materials submitted by a pro se attorney, but they need not.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when declining to consider Spence’s additional submissions. Spence is a licensed attorney, not the typical pro se litigant. She has formal legal training and 36 years of legal work experience, including serving as a senior attorney at the VA for over a decade. Her division at the VA handles contract procurement litigation, and she was specifically given “litigation-related work assignments and those that required coordination with the Litigation Team.” In these circumstances, the district court was not required to consider the facts introduced in Spence’s opposition memorandum, nor was it an abuse of discretion to limit review to Spence’s complaint.

(Mike Frisch)