Dying Wish: A Sad Scituation

A justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has imposed a three-month suspension for an attorney’s failure to carry out a terminally-ill client’s instructions for the disposition of a beachfront property

The respondent’s representation of Cheryl Bullock arose out of issues concerning a beach-front property in Scituate (Scituate Property or Property). Bullock had inherited the Property from her mother, who died testate in 1999. The mother’s will named Bullock as the personal representative and beneficiary of the entire estate, including the Scituate Property. However, the mother’s will was not probated in the years following her death. Thus, while ownership of the Scituate Property passed to Bullock in 1999, that change in ownership was never formally recorded, and Bullock’s late-mother remained the record owner of the Property.

In August 2014, Bullock was diagnosed with terminal pancreatic cancer at the age of fifty-three. Shortly thereafter, she drafted her own will. The terms of the will bequeathed various assets to certain named beneficiaries and provided for the residue of Bullock’s estate to be divided equally among four charities. Bullock wanted close family friends, the McNeils, to inherit the Scituate Property upon her own death, and her will specified that Michael and Deborah McNeil were to inherit Bullock’s personal belongings within the Property. The will was silent as to the Scituate Property itself, however, as Bullock wished to place the Property into a trust (McGrail Family Trust II) that she had established, which named members of the McNeil family as beneficiaries.

Bullock could not transfer title for the Scituate Property into McGrail Family Trust II until she became the record owner of the Property. In order to accomplish this, Bullock needed to probate her mother’s will. The Scituate Property was also “registered land,” a legal status that imposes additional prerequisites to transferring title. As a result, once Bullock’s mother’s will was admitted to probate and the estate inventory filed in the Probate Court, she would need to file a Subsequent Complaint for Certificate after Death (S-Petition) in the Land Court, along with certified copies of filings from the probate matter. The Land Court would then need to allow the S-Petition and issue a new certificate of title for the Scituate Property in Bullock’s name. At that point, Bullock would become the record owner of the Scituate Property, and thus able to convey the deed for the Property to McGrail Family Trust II. As detailed below, Bullock hired the respondent to complete these sequential legal maneuvers.

The opinion details the communications between Respondent and the client and her urgency in getting the matter resolved.

On December 14, 2015, Bullock emailed McLaughlin once again, telling him that she was “fading quickly and have basically 24 hour care now.” She went on to ask whether the Land Court had allowed the S-Petition yet, and whether she needed to sign “quit claim stuff,” urging McLaughlin, “I need this finalized like last week… I can’t leave a mess for my friend. What is [sic] status? Please let [sic] make sure everything is wrapped up and into the trust . . .Overnight anything to me.. Please let’s put this to bed! Please respond ASAP!!!!” McLaughlin did not immediately respond, but filed the estate inventory in the Middlesex Probate Court a few days later, followed by the S-Petition in the Land Court. On December 21, 2014, a full week after receiving Bullock’s urgent email, McLaughlin finally chose to reply. Once again, McLaughlin failed to advise Bullock of the unlikelihood of being able to complete the remaining steps necessary to place the Scituate Property into trust before her death. To the contrary, McLaughlin stated that “[e]verything has been filed with the Land court. I believe that we are done.” By telling Bullock that he believed they were “done,” McLaughlin falsely implied that the process was complete, and that she would not need to sign a deed to convey the Scituate Property to the trust, or have the trust recorded, once the S-Petition was allowed

The client died in January 2016 with her wish unfulfilled and residuary beneficiaries inheriting the property

The four residuary beneficiaries ultimately reached a settlement agreement with the McNeils, wherein the McNeils agreed to pay the charities $106,500 to purchase the Scituate Property. In June 2018, Wyman terminated McLaughlin, who charged Bullock’s estate at least $29,069 in legal fees, including for time spent defending Bullock’s estate against the McNeils. For their part, the McNeils brought a lawsuit for legal malpractice against McLaughlin, and the case was settled for approximately $40,000. [Personal representative] Wyman filed a malpractice suit against McLaughlin as well, on behalf of Bullock’s estate, though the case had not yet been resolved as of the filing of bar counsel’s petition.

Respondent had subsequently represented the personal representative

The hearing committee found that there was a significant risk that McLaughlin’s representation of Bullock’s estate would be materially limited by his own personal interest in minimizing his responsibility for failing to effectuate the transfer of the Scituate Property into trust. This finding is amply supported by the record. The McNeils’ affidavits go into great detail about McLaughlin’s representation of Bullock, and include quotes from the abovereferenced emails that starkly illustrate McLaughlin’s failure to adequately communicate with Bullock, as well as his affirmative misrepresentations about the status of the Scituate Property. In these circumstances, where McLaughlin’s conduct was directly placed at issue, it is readily apparent that his own personal interests would materially limit his ability to represent the personal representative of Bullock’s estate. Indeed, this is borne out by the various steps McLaughlin took to minimize his role in the failed transfer from others, including Wyman. Notably, McLaughlin chose not to inform Wyman when he received a letter from the McNeils’ attorney that pointed out the conflict of interest, noted his status as a potential witness in the equity complaint case, and threatened him with a malpractice complaint. Additionally, when McLaughlin informed the four residuary beneficiaries of the McNeils’ affidavits of objections, he falsely stated that the basis for the McNeils’ objections was an allegation that Bullock’s will “contains an error.” To the contrary, the McNeils alleged that Bullock intentionally omitted the Scituate Property from the will, that she had intended to convey the Property to McGrail Family Trust II, and that McLaughlin had failed to accomplish that task before her death. Yet McLaughlin failed to disclose any of the allegations concerning his own conduct in his letter to the residuary beneficiaries.

Conclusion

In sum, bar counsel has proven all of the violations charged. For the reasons discussed above, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.

(Mike Frisch)