Judge Removed

The Georgia Supreme Court removed a probate judge who was admitted to practice in 2013 and eected to office in 2020

In conclusion, in light of her multiple violations of the CJC rules in relation to several matters—some of them reflecting a flagrant disregard for the law, court rules, and judicial conduct rules; the pattern of violations that the Director proved by clear and convincing evidence; the extremely concerning nature of some of those violations, in particular with respect to the criminal contempt matter; and her behavior during the JQC inquiry, we conclude that removal is the appropriate sanction. See, e.g., Fowler, 287 Ga. at 472 (holding that removal from office was the appropriate sanction where the judge exhibited a “consistent pattern of misconduct” that stemmed from “willful misconduct in office . . . and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute,” among other things) (cleaned up); In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 275 Ga. at 406-412 (determining that removal from office was the proper sanction for a judge who, among other things, demonstrated a lack of competence in the law, failed to safeguard basic constitutional rights of litigants, and failed to respect and comply with the law with respect to multiple matters of misconduct, and noting that “[c]onsidered in isolation, none of [the judge’s] actions would warrant his removal from the bench” but that “[c]onsidered as a whole, . . . [the judge’s] actions demonstrate[d] a troubling pattern of ineptitude and misconduct”); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. at 850-852 (concluding that removal from office was the appropriate discipline for a judge who violated multiple former canons of the prior CJC, including in five instances disregarding defendants’ “basic and fundamental constitutional rights,” which “exhibit[ed] an intolerable degree of judicial incompetence, and a failure to comprehend and safeguard the very basis of our constitutional structure”).

Contempt proceedings

the Hearing Panel’s finding of bad faith with respect to Judge Peterson’s wrongful summary adjudication of the criminal contempt matter is authorized by the evidence presented at the hearing, particularly her dishonest testimony about her wrongdoing. As we have explained, although we do not expect judges to be perfect, “we can and do expect them to be honest. The judiciary has no place for dishonest persons,” as “‘[t]he judiciary’s authority . . . depends in large measure on the public’s willingness to respect and follow its decisions.’” Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 866 (citation omitted). Because Judge Peterson’s actions were not merely negligent, but painted a picture of conscious wrongdoing motivated by ill will, we agree that her actions were taken in bad faith.

Treatment of court personnel

By way of background, in April 2021, the Chief Judge of the Douglas County Superior Court limited Judge Peterson’s after-hours access to the Douglas County courthouse following an incident in which she allegedly improperly admitted public citizens to the courthouse without ensuring that they had undergone security screening by sheriff’s deputies.

Panic button

In a separate event related to Judge Peterson’s treatment of courthouse personnel, the sheriff’s deputy who was scheduled to escort Judge Peterson from her chambers to her courtroom on May 11, 2021 did not arrive in Judge Peterson’s chambers on time. Believing that she would be late for court, she pushed the panic button under her desk to summon the deputy. Thinking there was an emergency in Judge Peterson’s chambers, sheriff’s deputies hurried to her chambers. When they arrived, they realized that there was no emergency. At her hearing before the Hearing Panel, Judge Peterson testified that she did not know the button was a “panic button” that was to be used only in emergencies. The Hearing Panel expressly discredited Judge Peterson’s testimony on that point.

The court affirmed findings of misconduct in a pro se action the judge brought against her homeowners association.

Misconduct in a domestic matter

We agree; engaging in or allowing ex parte communications presents to the public an image of a judge who covertly interacts with a party in order to unfairly advance that party’s interests and jeopardizes the appearance of the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. Because Judge Peterson’s inappropriate actions taken in her judicial capacity, even if undertaken in good faith, appeared to be “‘unjudicial and harmful to the public’s esteem of the judiciary,’”

Wedding bell blues

In addition, the Hearing Panel made findings as to a separate incident, involving Judge Peterson’s conduct in allowing a party to a wedding over which she was scheduled to preside to enter the Douglas County Courthouse, while the courthouse was closed, without ensuring that the party underwent security screening by sheriff’s deputies, in contravention of an express directive from the Division Commander for Court Services with the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office not to allow the party inside 

In this proceeding

Moreover, the Hearing Panel’s determinations supported a conclusion that Judge Peterson was “disingenuous, if not outright dishonest,” during the JQC proceedings, because she provided untruthful or evasive testimony with respect to, among other things, her conduct regarding the HOA meeting and the courthouse wedding.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring.

I concur fully in the Court’s opinion today removing Judge Christina Peterson from office. I write separately in response to Commissioner Hyde’s thoughtful concurrence (joined by Commissioners McBurney and Lopez) to the JQC Hearing Panel’s Report and Recommendation. In his concurrence, Commissioner Hyde writes that for some of the counts of lesser misconduct proven by the JQC Director, he would have liked to have suggested a suspension without pay, but he does not believe that to be a type of judicial discipline authorized by the Georgia Constitution. I appreciate this careful respect the Hearing Panel members show for the constitutional limits on the authority of the JQC and this Court. And I agree that the question is open to reasonable debate. But as I explain below, I think that the best interpretation of relevant provisions of the Georgia Constitution is that the constitutional authority to discipline judges does include the authority to suspend a judge without pay.

11 Alive reported on a recent arrest of the judge

(Mike Frisch)