Sanction Upheld In Connecticut Matter
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed discipline imposed by the trial court
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court (1) erred by failing to consider that the delay in the underlying disciplinary proceedings violated his due process rights and (2) abused its discretion by suspending him from the practice of law for a period of ninety days. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
After a probable cause determination
What followed was a series of continuances, postponements, and other occurrences that ultimately delayed the hearing for eight months. Although that hearing commenced on the morning of February 13, 2020, the parties were not able to complete the hearing because the respondent’s counsel had an afternoon scheduling conflict with another matter. The reviewing committee granted a recess and subsequently sent notice to the parties that the hearing was to continue on April 23, 2020. By mid-March, 2020, however, the Judicial Branch had reduced its operations to hear only top priority matters as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 11, 2021, the requirement for a reviewing committee to be physically present at a contested hearing was eliminated, and the matter was scheduled for a virtual hearing on July 13, 2021. A lack of quorum due to an emergency with a reviewing committee member caused the matter to again be rescheduled, this time to September 28, 2021.
Approximately two weeks prior to the commencement of the September 28, 2021 hearing, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the grievance complaint, arguing, inter alia, that he has been ‘‘irreparably harmed and prejudiced by . . . the prior delays, and his due process rights to a fair and expeditious hearing have been violated.’’ Disciplinary counsel filed an objection to the respondent’s motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the respondent had failed to demonstrate any prejudice due to the delays.
Tria court on sanction
The court stated that ‘‘the Practice Book gives this court the power and responsibility to consider . . .the totality of the circumstances in fashioning a penalty. Unfortunately, based on the circumstances, particularly the respondent’s lack of any real sense of responsibility for the behavior at issue or the expression of any level of contrition, the court is not convinced that any level of disciplinary action will serve to guarantee that these issues will not arise again.’’ The court entered an order suspending the respondent from the practice of law for ninety days and, pursuant to Practice Book § 2-64, appointed a trustee to protect the interests of the respondent’s clients. From that judgment, the respondent now appeals.
Dalay
In sum, the reviewing committee determined that the delay in the disciplinary proceedings did not cause prejudice to the respondent. Having failed to test that finding by appeal, the respondent may not continue to argue—as a factual matter—that the delay prejudiced him. Although the respondent argues that he was deprived of due process during the disciplinary proceedings, he had sufficient process available to him by way of an appeal. As a result, the court did not err by failing to consider whether the delay in the disciplinary proceedings caused prejudice, both because the respondent had failed to appeal from that determination made by the reviewing committee, and because, pursuant to Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1), the court was precluded from considering any facts or evidence that did not directly address what action the court should take regarding the misconduct.
Sanction
On the basis of our plenary review of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court committed legal error in its determination of the appropriate discipline. Accordingly, the respondent’s first argument fails…
The respondent has not met his burden of demonstrating that the court acted arbitrarily by ordering a ninety day suspension. On the basis of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the discipline imposed was a clear abuse of discretion.
(Mike Frisch)