Sanction Vacated For Alex Jones Attorney
The Connecticut Appellate Court has remanded the sanctions imposed on Alex Jones’s attorney and ordered a new hearing before a different judge
The plaintiff in error, Norman A. Pattis, a Connecticut attorney and counsel of record for the defendants, Alex Emric Jones and Free Speech Systems, LLC, in the underlying consolidated tort actions arising out of the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School, filed this writ of error challenging the order of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months after determining that he had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. Pattis claims that the court (1) violated his procedural due process rights in initiating, sua sponte, disciplinary proceedings against him, pursuant to its inherent authority to discipline attorneys, on the basis of conduct that occurred outside of its presence, (2) improperly denied his motion to disqualify the Honorable Barbara N. Bellis from presiding over the disciplinary proceedings, (3) improperly determined that he had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct, and (4) imposed an arbitrary and disproportionate disciplinary order. We reject Pattis’ first two claims, but we conclude that the court incorrectly found that he violated certain provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, we grant in part the writ of error and remand the matter to the court to vacate the improper findings, as well as the attendant disciplinary order, and to conduct a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge.
Due process
Pattis does not contend that the court deprived him of sufficient notice or of a meaningful opportunity to be heard with regard to the show cause order. Instead, applying the Mathews factors, Pattis asserts that, ‘‘[i]n order to provide sufficient due process, a court’s institution of disciplinary proceedings should . . . [be] limited to conduct that occurs in its presence and not for what a judge might hear or see in the news.’’ We disagree…
In sum, after weighing the Mathews factors, we are not persuaded that due process mandates the imposition of a constraint on the Superior Court’s inherent authority to regulate and to discipline attorneys by drawing a distinction between conduct that occurred before the court and conduct that transpired outside of its presence. We conclude that the court did not violate Pattis’ procedural due process rights in initiating, sua sponte, disciplinary proceedings against him on the basis of conduct that occurred outside of its presence, and, therefore, we further conclude that Pattis has failed to demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights as required under the third prong of Golding.
Disqualification
We reject Pattis’ claim that Judge Bellis’ statements during the August 10, 2022 hearing discussing the reviewing committee’s dismissal of the June 12, 2019 grievance complaint and informing the parties of her decision to conduct the disciplinary proceedings directly are sufficient to cause a reasonable person to question her impartiality. Judge Bellis explained on the record that her recitation of the background of the case, including the reviewing committee’s dismissal of the June 12, 2019 grievance complaint, constituted an effort to conduct ‘‘fair and transparent’’ disciplinary proceedings and to accommodate Pattis’ counsel, who had recently appeared on behalf of Pattis and who had requested a continuance of the proceedings for medical reasons. Judge Bellis further stated that she was notifying the parties of her intent to preside over the disciplinary proceedings directly ‘‘in the interest of candor. . . .’’ Put simply, on the basis of the record, we cannot conclude that Judge Bellis’ impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Accordingly, we conclude that Pattis has failed to demonstrate that Judge Bellis abused her discretion in denying his motion to disqualify.
The ethics violations found below were based on his handling of discovery information
On the basis of these largely undisputed facts, the court concluded that ‘‘[Pattis] was obligated to safeguard the plaintiffs’ sensitive information by identifying it as such, and, when transmitting such information to an authorized recipient, informing the recipient accordingly. Furthermore, [Pattis] was bound to comply with the provisions of the protective order, which were clear and unambiguous. [Pattis] was on notice of the need to safeguard the records by virtue of the court’s written order stating the court’s ‘grave concerns’ that the . . .plaintiffs’ confidential mental health and other medical records would be improperly disseminated, the plaintiffs’ counsel’s repeated concerns, both orally and in writing, regarding [the plaintiffs’] confidential information, and Wolman’s written warning to [Pattis] on March 28, 2022. Despite all of this, [Pattis], incredibly, knowingly released the records to Lee and Reynal. Not only did he improperly release the records to Lee and Reynal, but he did so carelessly, taking no steps to designate the materials as protected by court order, mark them as confidential, or inform the recipients that they were in possession of sensitive and protected documents. Ultimately, [Pattis’] improper dissemination of the records, in conjunction with his failure to maintain the records in a safe and secure manner, led to the . . .plaintiffs’ most private information being improperly released to Lee, Reynal, and then Bankston, none of whom were counsel of record in any of the . . . Connecticut cases.’’
The trial but correctly found a Rule 1.1 (competence) violation but not the rule on safeguarding property
we conclude that the court, as a matter of law, incorrectly applied rule 1.15 (b) to encompass the plaintiffs’ confidential records. Accordingly, we further conclude that the court improperly determined that Pattis violated rule 1.15 (b).
And
we conclude that the record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Pattis knowingly violated the protective order. Accordingly, we further conclude that the court incorrectly determined that Pattis violated rule 3.4 (3).
But
we (1) reject Pattis’ claim that the court incorrectly determined that he violated rule 5.1 (b) and (c) insofar as Pattis exercised supervisory authority over Atkinson but (2) conclude that the court improperly determined that Pattis violated rule 5.1 (c) to the extent that Pattis acted as Reynal’s sponsoring attorney in Connecticut.
And
In the present case, Pattis’ misconduct in permitting the disclosure to unauthorized individuals of the plaintiffs’ personal and sensitive information unilaterally imposed a significant cost on the plaintiffs in their attempt to obtain justice in this matter. In short, Pattis’ mishandling of the plaintiffs’ confidential records falls within the expansive range of misconduct encompassed by rule 8.4 (4).
In sum, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the court correctly applied rule 8.4 (4). Accordingly, we reject Pattis’ claim.
Remand
Pattis’ final claim is that the trial court’s disciplinary order suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months was arbitrary and disproportionate. In light of our conclusion in part III of this opinion that the court improperly determined, in whole or in part, that Pattis violated rules 1.15 (b), 3.4 (3), and 5.1 (c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we further conclude that (1) the court’s disciplinary order, which was not predicated on Pattis’ violation of any particular rule, cannot stand, and (2) we must remand the case for a new hearing on sanctions before a different judge.
Final footnote
To be clear, our decision to remand the matter to a different judge should not be construed in any manner as calling into question Judge Bellis’ impartiality in conducting the disciplinary proceedings against Pattis.
Judge Ingrid Moll authored the unanimous opinion. (Mike Frisch)