Fear Of Dogs And The ADA

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Cobb) dismissed a claim brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act

As relevant to both of her ADA claims, Anderson does not allege facts sufficient to plausibly establish that being “afraid of dogs” renders her “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA. An individual is considered disabled under the ADA if they have “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” they have “a record of such an impairment,” or they have been “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The only allegation that has any chance of squeezing Anderson’s fear of dogs within that definition is her statement that “CloudHQ LLC is a pet-friendly company,” see ECF 1-2 ¶ 1, but this isolated, vague allegation is insufficient to plausibly show that her fear substantially limits her in any way as far as the ADA is concerned. That deficiency alone is sufficient to dismiss her ADA claims, but there are several other bases for dismissal.

Once again relevant to both ADA claims, Anderson’s complaint strongly suggests (without explicitly stating) that her employer did not actually know that she was afraid of dogs. See id. ¶ 2 (alleging that “if it [were] known [she] [was] afraid of dogs, she would not have been at CloudHQ LLC.”);see also ECF 8 at 10 (opposition to dismissal arguing that CloudHQ disqualifies applicants “if they are afraid of dogs” but that Anderson’s “CloudHQ LLC manager forgot to ask Marie Anderson ifshe is afraid of dogs”). An employer cannot be held liable for a failure to accommodate a disability it did not know about, and this lack of knowledge does not help Anderson’s disparate treatment claim either.

There are still additional reasons to dismiss Anderson’s complaint. With regard to her failure-to-accommodate claim, the only possible accommodation the Court can identify in the complaint is the ability to work from home. Yet, as described already, Anderson not only fails to allege that she requested and was denied that accommodation, she outright concedes that she received it. As for her disparate treatment claim, her utter lack of detail with regard to the two women who replaced her does not support a plausible inference of discrimination on the basis of disability. In fact, Anderson seems to concede in her opposition that Holmes—the individual who, unlike Anderson, went from a temporary position to a permanent one—has a disability. See ECF 8 at 4 (“Yes, Ashley Holmes is Black American; she is color blind that is the reason her monitors are black and white.”). Anderson’s ADA claims fail on almost every element, so they must be DISMISSED.

(Mike Frisch)