“A Ruse And A Sham”

The New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department ordered a six-month suspension of an attorney

The charges emanate from a common set of facts. The respondent represented the defendant in a matrimonial and custody matter in Supreme Court, Nassau County, before the Honorable Joseph H. Lorintz (Anonymous 2017-1 v Anonymous 2017-2, Index No. 202477-2017). The plaintiff in that matter was represented by Stephen Gassman, and Mark A. Green (hereinafter the AFC) represented the parties’ two children. On April 2, 2018, in an attempt to thwart a perceived plan by the plaintiff and his private investigator to engineer the defendant’s arrest, the respondent transported the defendant and her two children, in the respondent’s car, to the house of the defendant’s friend. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved by order to show cause for the respondent’s disqualification from representing the defendant, based on allegations that the respondent improperly spoke to the children about the subject of the representation while the respondent was transporting them, outside the presence of the AFC, their counsel, and without the AFC’s consent. Following a six-day hearing, by order dated October 23, 2018 (hereinafter the October 23, 2018 order), the respondent was disqualified from representing the defendant in the matrimonial and custody matter.

As charged in the petition, in an affirmation dated April 25, 2018, in opposition to the plaintiff’s order to show cause seeking to disqualify the respondent from representing the defendant, the respondent stated, among other things, that:

i. Gassman and the AFC were “looking to curry the favor of the [Supreme] Court . . .They have each, as is their unbridled custom and practice, contributed to this [c]ourt’s campaign largesse.”
ii. Gassman, the AFC, and the court “would like nothing better than to have me disqualified from this case because in that way they can continue their charade of justice.”
iii. Gassman and the AFC are “neophytes.”

In a sur-reply affirmation, dated May 18, 2018, submitted in response to the same order to show cause, the respondent stated that the AFC’s “naivete, inexperience and prejudice are shown in his Quixotic affirmation which more than tilting at windmills is a reducto ad absurdum.”

Following the October 23, 2018 order disqualifying the respondent, the defendant appealed. As charged in the petition, in his appellate brief, the respondent stated, inter alia, the following:

i. The disqualification hearing was a “travesty of justice” that “continued with the jump starting of a hoax; a tiddly winks of a disqualification hearing.”
ii. The disqualification hearing was “contrived by [the plaintiff], his lawyers and the AFC acting in concert with a neophyte Justice and all intimidated by the effective, zealous advocacy of appellant’s counsel.”
iii. Justice Lorintz “was clearly over his head having no idea about why a disqualification hearing should be held or how to hold one. He caved in to the supercilious demands of [Gassman] and the AFC.”
iv. The disqualification hearing “was a ruse and a sham cooked up by [the plaintiff’s counsel] and the AFC acting in concert. The [Supreme] Court had no idea what it was doing or how to conduct a so-called disqualification hearing.”
v. The “[c]ourt could not determine even the most rudimentary, fundamental issues.”
vi. Justice Lorintz was “so transparently deferential to [ ] Gassman throughout this case that he appeared to be more like his apprentice instead of a fair jurist.”
vii. “Had the court been interested in dispassionate truth, it would have stopped the proceedings in order to hold a hearing within the hearing to determine the full nature of the lies which were exposed before it.”
viii. “[G]iven [the AFC’s] bias against [the defendant] on every legal issue, he and the Justice were of a mind to tilt the sentiments of the children against [the respondent] and [the defendant].”
ix. Justice Lorintz did not act in the best interests of the children. “Instead, he acted in his own best interests and those of [the plaintiff] and his counsel.”
x. The children were “ostensibly but ineffectively represented by a flaccid AFC who worked hand and glove with [the plaintiff’s] counsel throughout this case and whose fees are being paid by [the plaintiff].”
xi. The court’s errors were “muddled by layers upon layers of corruption, influence peddling, legal bribery, perjury and subornation of it.”
xii. Justice Lorintz was a “neophyte jurist trying to demonstrate his toughness” and “striving to prove his machismo” by disqualifying the respondent.

The respondent appeared pro se in the matter of Liotti v D’Amato, Supreme Court, Nassau County, Index No. 614680/2019. In a May 28, 2019 affidavit, as charged in the petition, the respondent stated, among other things:

i. Justice Lorintz was a “new jurist” who was “trying to impress everyone with his legal acumen which was unfortunately nearly nonexistent.”
ii. Justice Lorintz “was conducting a charade of an actual legal proceeding, rather than a real one. A law school mock trial would have had more teeth to it.”
iii. “The subtle nuances of trial practice were beyond the ken of Justice Lorintz’s understanding. Had he experience as a trial lawyer instead of his judgeship being the product of a political cross endorsement, he might have had more cognition of these issues.”

Respondent explained his reasoning on these contentions at the bar hearing

In his report sustaining the three charges against the respondent, the Special Referee found, inter alia, that rule 3.3(f)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not require a showing that a statement is false. The Special Referee further found the respondent to be “highly credible” and noted extensive mitigation, including, among other things, the respondent’s “long and distinguished career,” with a focus on pro bono work, his strong showing of good character, his demonstrated genuine remorse, and the lack of material prejudice to the respondent’s client or other parties.

The court found extensibe mitigation but in aggravation

One of the admonitions and the censure, which was a reciprocal discipline based on the Fourth Circuit’s public admonition, involved similar misconduct as this present case. We also have considered the evidence the respondent submitted of his extensive trial and appellate experience, and his authoring of over 100 articles and several books on legal subjects, including, inter alia, the ethical practice of lawyers in appearing before the courts. In so doing, we conclude that the respondent was aware of the requirements placed on lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy and dignity; however, he chose to depart from these standards in the matters discussed herein.

(Mike Frisch)