Proposed Censure For Sex With Client

An Illinois Hearing Board recommends a public censure of an attorney for violation of the sex with a client rule

L.F.’s and Respondent’s testimony about the trajectory of their relationship was generally consistent. Respondent began representing L.F. in August 2014 in a telephone harassment criminal case. (Tr. 25-26, 81). Flirtations between Respondent and L.F. turned into texting of a sexual nature and then a physical sexual relationship. (Tr. 26-27, 30, 38-39, 113-19, 152-53; Adm. Ex. 3). Respondent admitted that he did not have an ongoing sexual relationship with L.F. in August 2014, when he began representing her, and that he and L.F. began a sexual relationship in October or November 2014. (Ans. at pars. 4, 5). Respondent and L.F.’s relationship ended shortly after her criminal case concluded in April 2015. (Tr. 44, 47, 154-55)

Aggravation

L.F. testified that she felt “used” by Respondent, hurt, embarrassed, and angry about his “abuse of power” during their relationship, which she struggled with for years before reporting him to the ARDC in 2022. (Tr. 46-47, 49, 51). She felt a power imbalance between them while her criminal case was pending because she was “in a vulnerable state” at that time and because of Respondent’s role as her attorney, which could affect the case outcome. (Tr. 43).

Respondent acknowledged that a client facing criminal charges trusts her attorney and is in a vulnerable position, but L.F. did not express to Respondent that she felt there was a power imbalance or that he was taking advantage of her during his representation. (Tr. 151-52, 206). Respondent maintained that, although his judgment was compromised in that he chose to have a sexual relationship with his client, it did not affect his ability in the courtroom, and “I would handle that case exactly the same today as I did back then.” (Tr. 200-06). L.F. was charged with telephone harassment for threatening and cursing at an attorney who represented her then-husband’s ex-wife in post-decree litigation. (Tr. 21-22, 55-56). Although this Class A misdemeanor was punishable by up to 364 days in jail and a $2,500 fine, L.F. was sentenced to supervision due to Respondent’s advocacy at her trial. (Tr. 82, 93)

Mitigation

After Respondent and L.F.’s relationship ended in April 2015, Respondent made changes in his life. In 2016, he moved downtown, started weekly to biweekly talk therapy with a psychologist, and met his current wife, who he married in 2019. (Tr. 130, 147, 149). He stopped mental health treatment prior to the pandemic in 2020 because he was no longer depressed. (Tr. 148-49). Respondent reflected, “My life has improved tremendously since then, with not only getting married, but having a baby; having a firm; kind of doing better each year.” (Tr. 150). He further explained, “the biggest thing I learned from therapy is don’t move the goal post. You know, I might not be at the final point that I want to be at, but anytime I’m making progress, I need to look at progress, and not look at the gap.” (Tr. 150-51).

The Administrator sought a short suspension

we find that the Administrator did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent asked L.F. to promise not to report him to the ARDC. L.F. and Respondent presented conflicting interpretations of their ambiguous text messages about promises. We find that Respondent’s explanation that “do[ing] something you promised you never would” and “promis[ing] me no matter what you would never abandon or hurt me” reasonably refers to his fear, as a divorcee suffering from depression, that L.F. would suddenly end their relationship. We do not find that these text messages, without additional corroboration, refer to a promise prompted by Respondent that L.F. would not report him to the ARDC.

For these reasons, we find that the only proven aggravation is Respondent’s persistence in knowingly violating Rule 1.8(j) for an ongoing period of six to seven months while he remained in a sexual relationship with L.F…

On balance, we determine that censure is the most appropriate sanction in this matter, where the only misconduct is a violation of Rule 1.8(j) and there is minimal aggravation and significant mitigation. In light of Respondent’s recognition of his wrongdoing, genuine remorse, and subsequent life changes, we find that he is unlikely to repeat his misconduct. Because we do not believe he poses a risk to the public or the profession, we determine that a censure fulfills the goals of the disciplinary process. 

(Mike Frisch)