Appearence Of Impropriety
The Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court granted a motion to disqualify a judge in a divorce matter
The affidavit of disqualification is granted to avoid the appearance of impropriety. The decision is not based on a finding of actual bias. Jardine alleges that the underlying divorce case was not randomly reassigned to Judge Celebrezze after a prior judge had recused, that Judge Celebrezze kept the case for herself, and that the motive for keeping the case was bias in favor of the receiver and the defendant and prejudice against Jardine. In response, Judge Celebrezze adamantly denies any bias or prejudice. The judge explains that as the administrative judge of the division, after two or more other judges have recused from a contentious or complex case, Judge Celebrezze often reassigns that case to herself to keep the case moving. However, as the administrative judge of the division, Judge Celebrezze’s authority to reassign the case after the prior judge’s recusal was limited. Rule 36.019(A) of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio and Local Rule 2(B)(2) of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division require the random reassignment of a case when a judge has recused. Therefore, to avoid the appearance of impropriety, Judge Celebrezze is disqualified.
Because the affidavit of disqualification is granted to avoid the appearance of impropriety, it is unnecessary to address any remaining allegations.This matter is returned to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, for random reassignment to another judge of that division.
The movant had filed the divorce
In March 2021, the defendant filed motions for the appointment of a receiver to oversee funeral homes and related entities that the parties jointly owned. Jardine opposed the motions. On July 14, Judge Jones granted the defendant’s motions and appointed a receiver. Among other things, Judge Jones ordered the receiver to marshal assets for five of the parties’ business entities.
The originally assigned judge recused herself.
Judge Celebreeze handled a number of subsequent issues relating to actions taken by the receiver and drew the disqualification affidavit
Jardine argues that Judge Celebrezze should be disqualified from his divorce case based on two allegations: (1) Judge Celebrezze is unable “to fairly and impartially consider the facts of [Jardine’s] case” and (2) the judge has demonstrated her bias in favor of the defendant and the receiver while exhibiting prejudice toward the affiant.
Alleged bias
In support of the allegation of bias and prejudice, Jardine asserts (1) that as the administrative judge, Judge Celebrezze failed to randomly reassign the underlying case after Judge Jones recused, in order to favor the receiver, and (2) that Judge Celebrezze’s personal and political relationship with the receiver, the judge’s relationships with members of the law firm representing the defendant, and the receiver’s relationship with members of the firm representing the defendant are evidence of bias in favor of the receiver and the defendant and evidence of prejudice against Jardine.
In response, Judge Celebrezze admits that she often assigns contentious and complex cases to her own docket when another judge recuses so “as not to overly burden [her] fellow judges of the Domestic Relations Division and to save the resources needed for the appointment of a visiting judge.” The judge also admits that the receiver is a longtime family friend, and the judge acknowledges that one of the receiver’s employees is the deputy treasurer of the judge’s campaign committee—which is a matter of public record. The judge further acknowledges that she has socialized with attorney Richard Rabb, who represents the defendant, but she denies any improper discussion of cases pending before her. And the judge admits to having a friendship with Robert Glickman, who works at the firm that represents the defendant, but the judge denies that Glickman has ever represented her or acted on her behalf.
The judge moved to seal portions of the affidavits including the judicial complaint and
Second, Judge Celebrezze argues that the original affidavit of disqualification contains the judge’s home address and that this information should be sealed from public access because to the judge’s knowledge, that information is not publicly available. The judge provides no statutory provision or caselaw to support that conclusion.
The judge also argues that exhibits F and K attached to the judge’s response, which are video exhibits, should remain under seal because the videos depict private information about her, such as the judge’s leaving her home and traveling to another residence. The videos were allegedly created by a private investigator whom Jardine had retained to follow the judge.
Granted and denied in part
The motion to seal exhibits F and K is denied. Judge Celebrezze has not cited any statute or caselaw that supports the sealing of videos depicting a public figure in a public place. While there may be situations when weighing the constitutional requirement of open courts against a judge’s privacy rights might permit the sealing of information in an affidavit-of-disqualification proceeding, Judge Celebrezze has failed to demonstrate that exhibits F and K should be sealed from public access.
Result
the clerk of this court is ordered to (1) redact the references to a disciplinary grievance on pages 3 and 9 of Judge Celebrezze’s June 22, 2023 response to the affidavits of disqualification and on pages 2 and 4 of her July 3, 2023 brief in support of her motion to seal, (2) redact the defendant’s private medical information on the third page of exhibit P attached to Judge Celebrezze’s June 22, 2023 response to the affidavits of disqualification, and (3) unseal all other filings in this affidavit-of-disqualification case.
Merits
Improper judicial assignment may create the appearance of impropriety and “may be grounds for disqualification.”
…Jardine’s affidavit of disqualification is granted to avoid the appearance of impropriety. This decision is not based on a finding of actual bias. However, as the administrative judge of the division, Judge Celebrezze’s authority to reassign the case after Judge Jones’s recusal was limited. Rule 36.019(A) of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio and Local Rule 2(B)(2) of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, require the random reassignment of a case when a judge has recused. Therefore, to avoid the appearance of impropriety, Judge Celebrezze is disqualified.
(Mike Frisch)