Vexatious Litigators

The Ohio Supreme Court has declared that three attorneys are “vexatious litigators”

We decline to accept this discretionary appeal filed on behalf of appellant, H.R. The purpose of this opinion is not to explain that decision but to explain why the three attorneys representing H.R. are being sanctioned for instituting a frivolous appeal. That sanction shall consist of appellee P.J.E.’s reasonable attorney fees, which may be recouped in the manner described in Section II(B) of this opinion. Further, as explained in Section II(C) below, we declare H.R.’s three attorneys to be vexatious litigators.

The appeal involved a denied continuance motion

The appeal brought by H.R. on July 19 was not the first time that the Stafford counsel have asked this court to decide whether a trial court’s denial of a motion for a continuance is immediately appealable as a final order. The Stafford counsel have asked this court no fewer than three times this year to accept an appeal presenting a substantially similar question. 

The court had directed one of the attorneys to show cause why sanctions for a frivolous appeal should not be imposed

Stafford filed a timely response, asking that this court reconsider the show-cause order and find that the appeal is neither frivolous nor worthy of sanctions. The response represents that it is filed on behalf of Stafford, Cruz, and Tauring because all three attorneys are counsel of record for H.R. All three attorneys signed the response in writing. Although our show-cause order extended only to Stafford, we now conclude, based on the representation that the response to the show-cause order was filed by all three attorneys, that it is appropriate for us to determine whether Cruz and Tauring ought to be sanctioned as well.

The court

The appeal brought by the Stafford counsel in this case is frivolous because it is neither warranted by existing law nor supported by a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

It is well established that a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for a stay or a continuance of a trial or a hearing is not immediately appealable as a final order.

The response

We cannot countenance the Stafford counsel’s failure to acknowledge the body of law directly adverse to the proposition of law advanced in the jurisdictional memorandum they filed. See Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir.2011) (“The ‘ “ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s contention does not exist is as unprofessional as it is pointless” ’ ”), quoting Mannheim Video, Inc. v. Cook Cty., 884 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir.1989), quoting Hill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir.1987). Because the proposition of law contained in the jurisdictional memorandum filed by the Stafford counsel is neither warranted by existing law nor supported by an argument calling for the modification or overruling of that law, we conclude that the memorandum is frivolous.

Sanction

The jurisdictional memorandum that the Stafford counsel filed on behalf of H.R. is frivolous. As a sanction, reasonable attorney fees may be recouped by P.J.E. from the Stafford counsel in the manner described in Section II(B) of this opinion. Further, we declare Stafford, Cruz, and Tauring to be vexatious litigators under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A), and they shall conform their conduct to the directives set forth in Section II(C) of this opinion. Finally, P.J.E.’s motion to strike is denied.

Section II(B)

Specifically, we prohibit Stafford, Cruz, and Tauring—individually or in any combination—from instituting legal proceedings in this court without first obtaining leave to do so, subject to the exception that proceedings may be instituted when the notice of appeal filed in this court arises from a final decree entered in a divorce case.

(Mike Frisch)