A Sufficient Sanction

After a remand for clarification of findings and proposed sanction, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a special master’s disbarment recommendation

we agree with the Special Master that Adams has violated Rules 1.4, 1.5, 1.15 (I), 1.15 (II) (a) and (b), 1.16, and 9.3. However, we disagree that disbarment is warranted under these particular facts and instead impose a one-year suspension, which is more consistent with our disciplinary precedent.

Misconduct and intent

Adams acted with an intent to obtain a benefit by keeping an unreasonably large share of the $7,000 settlement through his 14 superior position of power and control by maintaining control over the money as the client’s attorney and fiduciary. Adams refused to pay her anything until she agreed to his terms, and then paid her a portion of her funds only after a formal complaint was filed against him. His actions and refusal to cooperate fully demonstrated selfishness by attempting to advance his own interests over those of his client. Adams was given every opportunity to work with his client to resolve this dispute, but at every turn he doubled down on his refusal to take any responsibility or recognize that he violated his professional duties and responsibilities. In addition, his actions amounted to a gross abuse of his relationship with his client and a knowing and intentional abuse of his fiduciary position. Adams “again and again” failed to handle the disputed funds appropriately. See generally GRPC 1.15 (I) Comment [3A] (“In those cases where it is not possible to ascertain who is entitled to disputed funds or other property held by the lawyer, the lawyer may hold such disputed funds for a reasonable period of time while the interested parties attempt to resolve the dispute. If a resolution cannot be reached, it would be appropriate for a lawyer to interplead such disputed funds or property.”)

Sanction

Here, Adams failed to adequately communicate with his client about the $7,000 settlement, charged an unreasonable fee for obtaining the settlement, and failed to keep the settlement money in a separate IOLTA account and maintain proper records of the account. However, unlike Butler, Adams returned some of the settlement money to his client, and he did engage in some of the State Bar proceedings. Accordingly, we disagree with the Special Master and the State Bar that disbarment is warranted in this case. Instead, we conclude that under the particular facts of this case, and given the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a one-year suspension from the practice of law, with reinstatement conditioned on Adams providing restitution totaling $2,732.81, to his former client, is a sufficient sanction for his conduct in this matter.

(Mike Frisch)