Not Ready For Disposition

The Georgia Supreme Court has rejected a special master’s proposed one month suspension and remanded for further fact-finding in a disciplinary case involving misconduct in two client matters

it is plain to us that at least a lengthy suspension, if not disbarment, is the appropriate discipline for Tuggle’s misconduct in these matters, and we thus conclude that the recommended discipline is insufficient. At present, however, we decline to decide the appropriate discipline, because in one of the two matters here, certain developments have occurred since the date of the disciplinary hearing—developments on which we currently have no evidence of record, but which may affect our determination on the appropriate level of discipline. Accordingly, we reject the recommendations below and remand the case to the Board, with direction to remand the case to a Special Master for further factfinding of a limited nature and a new recommendation, consistent with this opinion and the new evidence developed below.

The court disagreed with the special master in several respects

Where we significantly part ways with the Special Master, however, is in his determinations as to Tuggle’s acknowledgment of wrongdoing and his remorse, his timely good-faith efforts to make restitution, and the mitigating effect of his substance use disorders.

First, as to Tuggle’s acknowledgment of wrongdoing and remorse, the hearing testimony on its face shows that Tuggle was willing to concede that he had committed only minor infractions, and only with caveats, excuses, and victim-blaming.

In sum

To recap, the record before us establishes that Tuggle violated six provisions of the GRPC in two client matters. In both matters, among the rules violated is Rule 8.4 (a) (4), which is “among the most serious violations with which a lawyer can be charged.” In the Matter of McCall, 314 Ga. 200, 206 (875 SE2d 765) (2022). Violation of that rule, along with three of the other rules violated, is punishable by disbarment. In our consideration of the factors relevant to assigning discipline, we have concluded that Tuggle violated the duties of competence, diligence, and candor, as well as his duties in communicating with clients, upon termination of his relationship with clients, and with respect to agreements conditioned on dismissal of disciplinary complaints. We have also determined that many of Tuggle’s actions were committed with intent or at least knowledge; that he caused serious actual and potential injury to both clients; and that the aggravating factors significantly outweigh the mitigating factors in both matters.

On such a record, the recommendation of a one-month suspension is grossly inadequate. Neither the Special Master nor the Review Board cited a single case supporting this level of discipline, and our own research shows that such a short suspension is rare and certainly not sufficient discipline in circumstances like those here.

Need for additional facts

In determining the appropriate discipline, it will be useful to have the benefit of fact-finding on the post-hearing developments in the malpractice suit arising from the matter in SDBD No. 7212, referenced in footnote 12 above. The disposition of that suit, as well as Tuggle’s conduct in those proceedings, may be relevant in determining the proper level of discipline to impose. We have therefore concluded that it is necessary to remand this case for additional fact-finding as to those post-hearing developments.

(Mike Frisch)