No Disbarment For Former Georgia Judge

The Georgia Supreme Court declined to disbar a former judge, instead imposing a three-year suspension

These disciplinary matters are before the Court seeking the disbarment of former Superior Court Judge Robert Mallory “Mack” Crawford (State Bar No. 194192), who has been a member of the Bar since 1987. Both of these matters arise from an incident in which Crawford obtained funds from the registry of the court on which he served as a judge, under circumstances that, according to the Bar, demonstrate that he was not entitled to the funds. In Case No. S22Y0631, Crawford is charged with a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), based on his first-offender Alford plea to a misdemeanor count of theft for his conduct in obtaining the registry funds. In Case No. S23Y0279, Crawford is charged with having violated the following provisions of the GRPC for his mishandling of client funds and dishonest conduct: Rules 1.5, 1.15 (I) (a), 1.15 (I) (c), 1.15 (I) (d), 1.15 (II) (a), 1.15 (II) (c), and 8.4 (a) (4). As explained more below, we impose a three-year suspension on the basis of Crawford’s violation of numerous GRPC in Case No. S23Y0279 and decline to consider the merits of Case No. S22Y0631.

He had resigned from the bench while facing charges 

We have not previously addressed the res judicata effect of a prior JQC proceeding on a subsequent attorney discipline proceeding such as this. But we can assume (without deciding) that res judicata applies to a disciplinary proceeding like this one, because we agree that, under these circumstances, res judicata does not bar this disciplinary proceeding. “‘Cause of action’” is “‘the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim’ . . . with special attention given to the ‘wrong’ alleged.” Coen v. CDC Software Corp., 304 Ga. 105, 112 (816 SE2d 670) (2018) (citation omitted). The special master correctly concluded that there was not an identity of the causes of actions between this matter and the JQC matter because (1) the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct charged in the JQC matter involved alleged wrongs – specifically, that Crawford failed to respect and comply with the law and that he used the prestige of his office to advance his private interests – that were different from those alleged in this matter; and (2) there were many facts that the Bar was required to prove in this matter that were not required to be proved in the JQC matter. Thus, regardless of whether the Bar and the JQC are privies and whether the resolution of the prior JQC matter constituted an adjudication on the merits, the Bar was not prevented by res judicata from seeking to discipline Crawford.

Sanction

although the special master recommended that Crawford be disbarred, we have reviewed the record as a whole and conclude, as the Review Board also concluded, that—in light of the fact that Crawford’s violations of the GRPC, while serious, involved only a single course of misconduct—the next-most serious discipline that we generally impose, a three-year suspension, is the appropriate discipline here. Accordingly, we hereby order that Crawford be suspended from the practice of law in this State for three years. Because there are no conditions on Crawford’s reinstatement other than the passage of time, there is no need for him to take any action either through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate his return to the practice of law.

(Mike Frisch)